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Introduction
In 1993, Professor Suzanne Stone wrote of "a growing body of
legal scholarship that is turning ... to the Jewish legal tradition to
advance debate in contemporary American legal theory."' Stone doc-
umented "the startling increase of citations to Jewish sources in public
American legal discourse" during the decade preceding her article.2
This trend has continued as scholars have employed concepts from
Jewish law in the analysis of such areas as health law,3 criminal law,4
legal ethics,5 legal interpretation,6 and constitutional amendment.7
Despite this trend, however, scholars differ in their views toward the
1. Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Texi" The Turn to the Jewish Legal
Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. Rv. 813, 814 (1993).
2. It. at 816 (citation omitted).
3. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, Method in Jewish Bioethics: An Overview, 20 J. CorNIMP.
L. 325 (1994); Joshua Fruchter, Doctors on Trial: A Comparison of American and Jewish
Legal Approaches to Medical Malpractice, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 453 (1993); Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, the Tree of Life,
and the Abortion Question, 72 TEx. L. REv. 559 (1994); Marc D. Stem, "And You Shall
Choose Life" Futility and the Religious Duty to Preserve Life, 25 SETON HALL L. Rav. 997
(1995).
4. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, "Perhaps What Ye Say Is
Based Only on Conjecture": Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L. Rnv.
1371 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Gordon J. Beggs, Proverbial Practice: Legal Ethics from Old Testament
Wisdom, 30 WAKE FoREsr L. Rv. 831 (1995); Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a
Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer Must Disclose a Client Confidence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1771
(1996); Arthur Gross Schaefer & Peter S. Levi, Resolving the Conflict Between the Ethical
Values of Confidentiality and Saving a Life: A Jewish View, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 1761
(1996).
6. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Apt, Aggadah, Legal Narrative, and the Law, 73 OR. L. Rev.
943 (1994); Shael Herman, The "Equity of the Statute" and Ratio Scripta: Legislative Inter-
pretation Among Legislative Agnostics and True Believers, 69 TUL. L. Rav. 535 (1994);
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How
to Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. Comp. L. 581 (1994).
COMPARING JEWISH LEGAL THEORY
value and validity of applying principles of Jewish law to American
legal theory.
Professor David Dow, who has argued that Jewish law can be
used to resolve the counter-majoritarian difficulty,8 writes that "the
normative ontology of the systems of Jewish and American law are so
nearly identical that the Judaic resolution of certain theoretical diffi-
culties can be wholly transplanted to the American domain." 9
Others appear less optimistic. Professor Steven Friedell, for ex-
ample, who has compared Jewish legal attitudes with feminist juris-
prudence, 10 observes that "Jewish law has policies and purposes that
are unique and that make the application of Jewish law in a modem
legal system difficult."" Similarly, Stone notes one of the fundamen-
tal differences between the Jewish and American legal systems: "Jew-
ish law is not only a legal system; it is the life work of a religious
community. The Constitution, on the other hand, is a political docu-
ment." 2 Therefore, Stone warns, American theorists "should be cau-
tious not to derive too many lessons from the counter-text of Jewish
law."' 3 Conversely, Stone asserts that "[t]he Jewish legal tradition is
being subtly reinterpreted to yield a legal counter-model embodying
precisely the qualities many contemporary theorists wish to inject into
American law."' 4
7. See Professor Sanford Levinson's discussion of why the book he edited on consti-
tutional amendment includes a chapter on changes within Jewish law. Sanford Levinson,
Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECrION: THE THE-
ORY AND PRACrICE OF CONSTITUONAL AmENDmENT 8 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
(discussing the inclusion in the book of Noam J. Zohar, Midrash: Amendment Through the
Molding of Meaning).
The last several years have seen a similar increase in Jewish law courses in American
law schools. Professor Jeffrey Roth has cited a February 1994 survey that documented 33
courses in Jewish law at 28 American law schools. See Jeffrey I. Roth, Fraud on the Surviv-
ing Spouse in Jewish and American Law: A Model Chapter for a Jewish Law Casebook, 28
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 101, 101 n.1 (1996). In addition, Roth has noted the significance
of the formation of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Jewish Law. Id.
at 101. As a result of the increased interest in Jewish law in American law schools, Roth
has called for a casebook on Jewish law and proposed a model chapter on the subject of
wills.
8. David R. Dow, Constitutional Midrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's
Problem, 29 Hous. L. REv. 543 (1992).
9. Id. at 544.
10. Steven F. Friedell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to a Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L.J. 915 (1992) (book review).
11. Steven F. Friedell, Book Review: Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 909, 919 (1993).
12. Stone, supra note 1, at 894.
13. Id- at 893-94.
14. Id. at 814.
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This Article explores some of the ways in which Jewish law may
shed light on issues in American constitutional theory. While ac-
knowledging that there are fundamental differences between a reli-
gious legal system and a secular one, the Article attempts to show that
certain conceptual similarities between American law and Jewish law
allow for meaningful yet cautious comparison of the two systems.
Part I provides a broad historical and analytical overview of inter-
pretation in Jewish law. As I am mindful of Stone's observations, one
of the aims of Part I is to provide a framework through which to con-
sider the Jewish legal system on its own terms, before applying it to
American legal theory. 15 Many of the issues discussed in Part I find
their parallels in American legal interpretation. Some of the similari-
ties are addressed expressly, while others are more implicit.
Part II of the Article offers a specific conceptual framework for
comparing Jewish law with American law. It considers questions of
flexibility in legal interpretation in the two legal systems. In particu-
lar, Part II compares and contrasts the notion of "rules and standards"
in Jewish law and American constitutional law. One of the goals of
Part II is to provide a further example of how Jewish law can be used
to address some important issues in contemporary American constitu-
tional theory.
Finally, this Article concludes with the hope that the current turn
to the Jewish legal model in American legal scholarship will continue,
but through a principled and accurate view of the Jewish legal system,
in order to allow for illuminating comparative study.
I. An Introduction to Interpretation in Jewish Law, with
References to American Constitutional Theory
Professor Menachem Elon has aptly summarized the "one basic
norm and one single supreme value" of Jewish law: "the command of
[G-d] as embodied in the Torah given to Moses at Sinai."' 6 The term
15. This Article as a whole (Part I in particular) is prompted in part by Professor
Lawrence Lessig's comment on the inclusion in a book on constitutional amendment of
Noam Zohar's essay on changes within Jewish law. See supra note 7. In acknowledging
the value of Zohar's essay in relation to American legal theory, Lessig laments that "there
is no way that lawyers can properly enter the world of Judaic interpretation through a
single essay." Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to Im-
perfection, 74 TEx. L. REv. 839, 842 (1996). It is my hope that this Article will at least
contribute to the ability of legal scholars to understand Jewish legal theory better.
16. MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 233 (Bernard
Anerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., Jewish Publication Soc'y 1994); see also AARON
KIRSCHENBAUM, Eourry IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES IN LAw 10 (1991)
("The ultimate legal principle (Grundnorm) is the rule that the Torah, the Five Books of
"Torah," in this sense, refers to the entire corpus of revealed law that
Moses received at Sinai. Part of the Revelation at Sinai consisted of
the Written Torah-the Five Books of Moses. Because it is a written
text, in order to be understood, the Written Torah must be inter-
preted. To facilitate its interpretation, G-d revealed to Moses an Oral
Torah as well.17 Moses was given specific details of some of the laws,
obviating the need for human interpretation of the text with respect to
those details.18 Thus, those details, albeit an interpretation of the text,
were part of the revealed Torah. In addition, the Oral Torah included
a number of techniques through which the text of the Written Torah is
interpreted.1 9 Among the most important techniques were the herme-
neutic rules, which comprise a system of legal interpretation through a
specialized method of literary analysis.
Laws and principles mandated by both the Written and Oral To-
rah have the authority of being d'oraita, a Talmudic adjective form of
the Aramaic translation of "Torah."20 To describe a law or legal prin-
ciple as d'oraita is roughly equivalent to describing a law or principle
in American law as being based in the Constitution. The serious na-
ture of interpretation of the Torah is underscored by the fact that the
substantive interpretation itself takes on constitutional authority-
d'oraita. For example, the Torah states that on the Sabbath, it is for-
Moses, is of binding authority for the Jewish legal system. Parallel to this Written Torah is
the Oral Tradition, which Jewish theology traces back to Moses from [G-d]."). According
to the medieval scholar Maimonides, two of the thirteen fundamental principles of Judaism
are that Moses received both the Written and Oral Torah from G-d at Sinai and that the
Torah has immutable authority. See Maimonides, Introduction to Perek Chelek, in INTRo-
DUCTIONS TO COMMENTARY ON THE MISIA 107, 144-46 (Mordechai Rabinowitz, ed.,
1961).
17. The Oral Torah was transmitted orally, from generation to generation, through a
carefully administered educational system. See MisHNA, Avoth 1:1; MAIMONIDES, Intro-
duction to Mis-nE TORAH [hereinafter MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAw]. As a result of per-
secution and exile, the Oral Torah was ultimately recorded in writing. See TALMUD BAVLI,
Gittin 60a, especially the Tosafoth Rid commentary. The Talmud is the written, authorita-
tive compilation of the oral traditions and interpretations. See MAIMONIDES, Introduction
to the Mishna, in INTRODUCTIONS TO COMMENTARY ON THE MIsHNA, supra note 16, at 1,
85 [hereinafter, MAIMONIDES, Introduction to the Mishna]. It is comprised of the Mishna,
which was compiled in the Land of Israel around the year 188 C.E., and the Gemara, which
was compiled in Babylonia around the year 589 C.E. See ARYEH KAPLAN, Tim HAND-
BOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 187,237 (1974). A version of the Gemara was compiled in the
Land of Israel as well (Talmud Yerushalmi), but the Babylonian Talmud, or Talmud Bavli,
is more complete and more authoritative. See MAIMONIDES, Introduction to the Mishna,
supra, at 84.
18. See MAIMONDES, Introduction to the Mishna, supra note 17, at 37.
19. See id. at 37-38; ELON, supra note 16, at 318-70.
20. See NACHMANIDES, Commentary to Maimonides, Book of Commandments, espe-
cially commentary to Chapter 2.
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bidden to engage in melakha2 1-usually translated as "work."'
Other than an express prohibition against lighting a fire on the Sab-
bath,23 the text of the Torah offers no details of what work is forbid-
den.24 Thus, it became necessary for legal authorities to interpret the
term "melakha" to determine what actions or activities are forbidden
on the Sabbath. Once the authorities determined that writing, for ex-
ample, is one of the activities prohibited on the Sabbath,25 the law
against writing became d'oraita, and it carries the same import as the
law against lighting a fire, which is spelled out in the text.
This quality of legal interpretation in Jewish law finds its parallel
in American constitutional interpretation. If the Supreme Court,
through interpreting the Constitution, determines that there is a sub-
stantive right to abortion, then this right itself is understood to be part
of constitutional law. As a result of the Court's interpretation, for
most practical purposes there is no qualitative difference between the
right to free speech or free exercise of religion, which have been part
of the text of the Constitution for 200 years, and the more recently
articulated right to an abortion. Similarly, an interpretation of the
text of the Torah, which expounds on or clarifies the law, extends be-
yond the text the range of what laws and principles are considered
d'oraita.26
21. See Exodus 20:10.
22. See, e.g., THE HOLY ScRnruREs 173 (Jewish Publication Society 1955).
23. See Exodus 35:3.
24. There are less explicit descriptions of activities prohibited on the Sabbath in Exo-
dus 16:29 and Numbers 15:32-36.
25. See TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbath 73a.
26. If the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or if
Congress and the States were to pass an amendment to the Constitution contrary to the
rights recognized therein, the right to obtain an abortion would lose its constitutional basis.
A similar though more limited dynamic exists in Jewish law as well. If the Sanhedrin (High
Court) interprets the revealed law in a certain way, that interpretation becomes the author-
itative definition of what the Torah requires. However, a later Sanhedrin has the authority
to interpret the law differently. The later interpretation overrules the earlier one, replacing
it as the authoritative definition of the Torah's laws. See infra text accompanying notes
145-87.
In Jewish law, legal interpreters lack the authority to "amend" the Torah. See Deuter-
onomy 13:1; MAIMONIDES, CODE oF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1,
Laws of Mamrim 2:9. In this way, however, they are no different than American judges.
The Supreme Court does not amend the Constitution when it interprets its provisions. It is
only through the legislative process that the actual text of the Constitution may be
changed. In Jewish law, the courts' role as legislators is distinct from their role as interpret-
ers, and there are broad limitations on their legislative power. See id. at Laws of Mamrim
2:9. One basic limitation is that judicial "legislation" may not contradict the substance of
the Torah's laws. See id.; ELON, supra note 16, at 478-81.
This Part explores a number of themes in the interpretation of
Jewish law, including sources and methods of interpretation, expan-
sion and limitation through interpretation, authority in interpretation,
and precedent. Many of the issues addressed in this Article find paral-
lels, to varying degrees, in American legal interpretation, some of
which will be discussed. This Part also demonstrates, if only implicitly,
some of the difficulties involved in trying to compare a religious legal
system with a secular one.
A. Sources and Methods of Interpretation
There are three basic sources and methods of legal interpretation
in Jewish law. 7
1. Interpretations Revealed to Moses at Sinai
As noted above, certain interpretations were revealed to Moses
through the Oral Torah, and therefore need not be derived. In the
Introductions to Commentary on the Mishna, Maimonides compiled a
list of numerous places in which the Talmud concludes that details of
textual laws were given as part of the Oral Law to Moses at Sinai.28
Maimonides divides this list into two categories. One category con-
sists of details that cannot be derived through logical or textual analy-
sis.2 9 It is understandable that if there are no means to interpret a
vague law, a definition must somehow be supplied. Maimonides notes
that in these cases, the Talmud states the details of the law without
even attempting to explain why the law is as stated.3"
The other category includes definitions which, although
presented to Moses at Sinai, could have been derived as well.31 In
these cases, the Talmud undertakes an analysis in order to derive the
definition based on the text of the Torah.32 Nevertheless, Maimonides
notes, these definitions, recorded in the Talmud over hundreds of
years, are never actually subject to debate or doubt.33 The aim of the
Talmudic exercise is only to show that the laws find support in the
written text.
27. See generally MAIMONIDES, Introduction to the Mishna, supra note 17, at 30-40;
RABBI Zvi HIRSCH CHAIES, Introduction to the Talmud, in COLLECrED WRINGS oF
RABBI Zvi HIRSCH CHAms 281, 284-91 (1985).
28. MAIMONIDES, Introduction to the Mishna, supra note 17, at 34-36.
29. See id. at 33.
30. See id.
31. See id at 31-32.
32. See id at 32-33.
33. See id at 31.
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2. Exegetical Interpretation of the Text
There are many different methods of textual hermeneutics em-
ployed throughout the Talmud and other works of halakhic interpreta-
tion.34 Most of these methods involve a specialized form of literary
analysis. On one level, the logic of these methods is often accessible
to us; in fact, some of the methods find their parallels in American
constitutional and statutory interpretation. Yet the ultimate determi-
nation of which method to apply under which circumstances is not
always apparent, and the conclusions of law are based on an internal
logic specific to a unique and lost art.
3. Logic and Observation
A final source of legal interpretation is reasoning which
originates in logic and observation rather than in textual interpreta-
tion. Sometimes this type of reasoning is used to determine how to
interpret properly the text itself, while at other times it is used to ex-
trapolate a principle from a text or to extend a clearly stated principle
to new situations. In addition, logic and observation are occasionally
used as a source of law, largely independent of any text.
4. Methods of Interpretation in Practice
To understand how these sources and methods of interpretation
are used in practice, it is helpful to look at some specific laws. For
example, the Torah contains a mitzva,35 a commandment, to eat the
paschal lamb on the first night of Passover.36 Two of the central
verses relating to this mitzva, presented in the context of the exodus
from Egypt, state in part: "All of the assembled Nation of Israel shall
slaughter [the paschal lamb on the fourteenth day of the first
month],"37 and "they will eat the meat [of the paschal lamb] on that
night. 38
Some details of these laws, which cannot be derived from either
textual or logical analysis, were revealed to Moses at Sinai.39 One ba-
sic detail not supplied by the text relates to the method in which the
34. For an extensive discussion of these methods, see ELON, supra note 16, at 318-70.
35. The plural of mitzva is mitzvot.
36. See, e.g., Exodus 12:8; TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachbn 99b. In Jewish law and religion,
the calendar date begins and ends at night. Thus, the fourteenth day of the first month of
the year is the eve of Passover, while that night is the fifteenth of the month, the first night
of Passover.
37. Exodus 12:6.
38. Id. at 12:8.
39. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
meat must be prepared before it is eaten. The Torah commands to
"slaughter" the animal, but it does not elaborate on the method of
slaughtering. The Talmud concludes that, because the details of ritual
slaughtering cannot be deduced through textual or logical analysis,
they were therefore revealed to Moses at Sinai, as part of the Oral
Torah.40
Once the method of preparing the meat is determined, the next
question involves how to fulfill the commanded action of eating the
meat. The text, however, does not specify the quantity of meat that
must be consumed. In fact, there are a number of both positive and
negative mitzvot in the Torah relating to the consumption of food,4'
but the Torah does not quantify how much food must or must not be
eaten in each case. Nor does there seem to be a system of logical and/
or textual analysis through which it would be possible to interpret the
word "eat." The Talmud concludes that the definition of eating falls
within the category of laws revealed to Moses at Sinai through the
Oral Torah.42
Another question is when must the meat be eaten. Although the
Torah expressly states that the meat must be eaten at "night," it does
not define until what time the technical term "night" extends. Nor did
the Oral Torah supplement the Written Torah in this case by provid-
ing a definition of "night." Therefore, legal authorities relied on tex-
tual hermeneutics to arrive at a definition. 43 Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria
looked to another context in which the phrase "that night" is found.
He noted that just a few verses later, in the same discussion of the
exodus, G-d said to Moses, "I will pass through Egypt on that night."44
The definition of the phrase "that night" in the second verse can be
obtained by examining a third verse, in which G-d stated that "at mid-
night, I will pass into the land of Egypt. '45 The third verse supplies
details not included in the second verse, indicating that the time pe-
riod at which "that night" ends is midnight. Rabbi Elazar thus con-
cluded that the paschal lamb may be eaten until midnight.46
40. See CHAjES, supra note 27, at 287 (citing generally to TALMUD BAvLt, Hullin).
41. See, ag., discussion infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
42. See TALMUD BAVLI, Eruvin 4a-4b.
43. See TALMUD BAVLI, Berakhoth 9a; TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 120b.
44. Exodus 12:12.
45. Id. at 11:4.
46. "Midnight" in this context is defined not as 12:00 a.m., but as the mid-point be-
tween sunset and sunrise on the first night of Passover. See MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY
ON THE MISHNA, Berakhoth 9b.
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The majority of the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Elazar, based on
a different method of hermeneutics. The Sages also relied on other
verses, but instead of looking to verses that include the term "that
night," they looked to verses that relate directly to the commandment
of eating the paschal lamb. They observed that the text of the Torah
further commanded that the meat be eaten "with haste." 47 The use of
the phrase "with haste"- in the context of the exodus is understood by
the Sages to refer to the point in time in which the Nation of Israel
was to proceed with haste.4 The identity of this point in time is de-
rived from yet a third verse. G-d told Moses that on the night of the
exodus, the Nation of Israel should not leave their houses "until
morning."49 The arrival of morning, then, is the time at which they
would leave their houses and proceed "with haste" in order to flee
Egypt. Thus, the Sages interpreted the phrase commanding to eat the
paschal lamb "with haste" as teaching that it may be eaten until
morning.50
There are also a number of laws relating to the paschal lamb
which are derived through the third method of interpretation,
originating in logic and observation, which are then applied to under-
stand the text or to derive legal principles. One such interpretation
relates to further details of the preparation of the meat from the pas-
chal lamb. In order to prepare this meat for the mitzva, one must
comply with the general laws of kashruth,5 1 which apply to any food
that is eaten and include the command "not to eat the blood" of an
animal.52 Although it was revealed to Moses to what extent the blood
must first be removed from the animal before the meat may be
eaten,53 there were no guidelines for how to remove the blood. To
arrive at such a method, the authorities relied on logic and observa-
tion. Based on observations of the physical nature of objects, the au-
47. Exodus 12:11.
48. See TALMUD BAVLI, Berakhoth 9a; TALMUD BAVL, Pesachim 120b.
49. Exodus 12:22.
50. Although the Sages held that, in principle, the paschal lamb could be eaten until
morning, in practice they held that a person should eat the meat before midnight, to avoid
the possibility of violating a commandment. See TALMUD BAVLi, Berakhoth 9a. One of
the sources of authority for Rabbinic legislation is Leviticus 18:30, which is understood to
require legal authorities to insure adherence to the laws by instituting preventive safe-
guards. See TALMUD BAVLI, Yevamoth 21a. In the case of the paschal lamb, the Torah not
only mandates eating meat, but adds a prohibition against leaving over the meat until
morning. See Exodus 12:10. Thus, to guard against violation of this prohibition, the Sages
advised that the meat be eaten before midnight, far in advance of the morning hour.
51. Kashruth is the noun form of the adjective kosher.
52. See e.g., Leviticus 3:17.
53. See CHAEins, supra note 27, at 284.
thorities determined a method of "salting" the meat to draw out the
blood.54
Finally, through logic and observation, the Talmud analyzes one
of the two verses originally cited above relating to the paschal lamb, in
order to extrapolate a general legal principle. The Torah commands
"all of the Children of Israel" to slaughter the paschal lamb on the eve
of Passover.55 The Talmud notes that, in practice, not every individual
slaughtered a lamb on that day; 6 indeed, given the various regulations
regarding sacrifices, it would have been physically impossible for
every individual to slaughter a different animal on that day. Every
individual did eat from a paschal lamb that night, however, with most
eating animals slaughtered by a much smaller number of individuals.57
The Talmud therefore looked for a legal principle to reconcile the
commandment that each individual slaughter a lamb with the practice
that most individuals did not themselves perform this act. The Talmud
concluded that through the principle of agency, the majority of indi-
viduals could appoint those who actually performed the act of slaugh-
tering to be their agents for this act.58 Thus, employing logic and
observation to recognize the impossibility of interpreting the law to
require each individual to slaughter a lamb personally, the Talmud ex-
trapolated the legal principle of agency by interpreting the text.
B. Interpretative Expansion and Limitation
1. Mitzvot
As a general rule, in terms of interpretation, it may be useful to
divide the legal segments of the Torah into two categories. The first
category is the mitzvot, which mandate or prohibit certain activities.
While it is often necessary to define the scope of each of the mitzvot,
the activities are largely well-defined; if the text of the Torah does not
provide a working definition, the Oral Law ordinarily provides the
necessary information. 59 Thus, authorities who interpret the Torah
have a limited role as well as limited discretion in defining these activ-
ities. Although a certain level of interpretation will be necessary to
apply these laws to new circumstances or to interpret vague terms that
are not explained by the Oral Law, the revealed and hermeneutically
54. See id, at 313.
55. Exodus 12:6.
56. See TALMUD BAVLI, Kedushin 41b.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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derived laws present a broad and clear understanding of what activi-
ties are mandated or prohibited.
In addition to the fact that the basic details of mitzvot often do
not require interpretation, the discretion of interpretive authorities to
limit the application of these laws is itself broadly limited. It is true
that, in a sense, any interpretation may, upon application, function as
a limitation. However, the license to interpret and perhaps limit the
mitzvot extends only to questions of applying the mitzvot to new cir-
cumstances or interpreting vague terms. There is no license to con-
clude, based on a consideration of what may appear to be the
rationale behind a commandment, that a clearly expressed and de-
fined commandment should not apply under unusual circumstances or
to particular individuals.
These ideas may be understood through an examination of one of
the mitzvot. In a number of places, the Torah mandates eating matzo
on Passover.6 ° In fact, the matzo is to be eaten on the first night of
Passover, together with the paschal lamb.61 To allow for the proper
observance of this commandment, many questions of interpretation
had to be answered.
The most basic question involves the definition of "matzo."
Without guidelines, it would be meaningless to suggest a definition for
a mysterious food. There would not seem to be a system of logical or
textual analysis through which to interpret the word. It appears ele-
mentary that there was no question, at the time of the commandment,
as to what food qualified as matzo. It is possible that at the time and
place of the commandment, matzo referred to a clearly identifiable
food. In comparison, a criminal statute discussing cocaine does not
have to provide a technical definition of cocaine.62 In the absence of a
widely recognized definition, Moses would presumably have been in-
structed, with sufficient detail, that matzo was a baked mixture of
grain and water that did not leaven. Implicit in this basic information
would have been a definition of the leavening process as well. With
60. See e.g., Exodus 12:8, 15, 18, 20; Leviticus 23:6; Deuteronomy 16:3, 8.
61. See Exodus 12:8.
62. Similarly, in Professor Kent Greenawalt's hypothetical, when Georgia, the head of
the household, tells Kent, the housekeeper, to buy "soupmeat," the range of choice for
soupmeat "may have been narrowed by past understandings or in some other way.
If... Georgia and Kent have established together that a certain kind of meat is what they
will use for soupmeat in the household, then Georgia's reference to soupmeat may be
taken to refer ... to the precise kind of meat involved." Kent Greenawalt, From the
Bottom Up, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. (forthcoming July 1997) (manuscript at 6, on file with
author); see also Transcript of Proceedings, Northwestern University/Washington University
Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 940-52 (1995).
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regard to these details, there was neither a need for nor the possibility
of interpretation.
With the subject matter of the commandment somewhat clearly
defined, the next set of questions might involve the nature of the com-
manded action. These questions, as well as the answers, are the same
as those related to the commanded action of eating the paschal lamb.
First, the Torah did not articulate what quantity of matzo must be con-
sumed in order to fulfill the requirements of the commandment; it
simply stated that all individuals must "eat" matzo on Passover. The
quantity of matzo to be eaten, like all of the Torah's laws involving
quantities and measurements,63 was revealed to Moses at Sinai, and is
the quantity applicable to most mitzvot that involve eating-including
the mitzva to eat the paschal lamb.
In addition, the Torah did not state until what time the matzo
may be consumed. The answer to this question was not clear from the
text and not revealed to Moses at Sinai and therefore had to be de-
rived through textual exegesis. In fact, the analysis is identical to the
one relating to the proper time frame for eating the paschal lamb,
because the Torah commands that the paschal lamb be eaten together
with the matzo.64 As a result, the time frame is the same for both
foods, and the same dispute in the Taimud concerning the time frame
for the meat arose with regard to the matzo.65
The revealed Written and Oral Torah, along with textual exege-
sis, thus provide the details necessary to fulfill the commandment to
eat matzo on the first night of Passover. Yet even when the details of
a mitzva are resolved, it seems inevitable that circumstances will arise
that are not explicitly covered by the revealed law. It will then be
necessary to interpret the mitzva to determine whether the parame-
ters of the mitzva extend to the unaddressed circumstances.
One category of new circumstances relating to a mitzva involves
destruction or unavailability of the subject matter of the mitzva. The
Torah commands one to eat the paschal lamb together with matzo, as
well as with marror-a bitter herb.66 With the destruction of the Tem-
ple in Jerusalem, it became impossible, for a number of reasons, to
prepare the paschal lamb. Thus, with regard to the commandment to
eat the paschal lamb, under present circumstances, the subject matter
63. See TALMUD BAVLi, Eruvin 4a-4b.
64. See Exodus 12:8.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
66. See Exodus 12:8.
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of the mitzva no longer exists. As it is currently impossible to eat the
paschal lamb, the mitzva cannot technically be observed.
A more difficult question for legal authorities after the destruc-
tion of the Temple related to whether the Torah's commandments to
eat matzo and to eat marror remained intact. The answer was once
again the subject of a dispute in the Talmud. The crux of the dispute
was based on textual interpretation. Rava observed that, in addition
to the verse that commands eating matzo and marror together with
the paschal lamb, another verse in the Torah commands eating matzo
on the first night of Passover,67 without mention of either the paschal
lamb or marror.68 In interpreting the Torah, there is a strong pre-
sumption against superfluity.69 Thus, the additional verse's command-
ment to eat the matzo must indicate an additional law. Rava
concluded that the second verse teaches that the obligation to eat the
matzo exists independent of the presence of the paschal lamb. ° In
contrast, Rava held, because the command to eat the marror is found
only in conjunction with the paschal lamb, when the paschal lamb can-
not be eaten, there is no independent obligation to eat the marror.71
Rav Acha bar Yaakov, however, focused on the first verse, and
concluded that the obligation to eat matzo is also dependent on eating
the paschal lamb.72 With regard to the other verse noted by Rava,
Rav Acha agreed that the verse cannot be superfluous but interpreted
the verse to teach a different law relating to eating matzo.73 Rava, in
turn, held that the law which Rav Acha deduced from the second
verse can be derived from the logical extension of yet another verse.74
In Rava's view, then, the second verse regarding the matzo remained
apparently superfluous and thus had to teach an otherwise unknown
law-the law that the obligation to eat matzo exists independent of
eating the paschal lamb.75
67. See id. at 12:18.
68. See TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 120a.
69. See eg., id.
70. See id
71. See id. Although the Torah's command to eat the marror is dependent on the pas-
chal lamb, in the absence of the paschal lamb there is still a Rabbinically mandated re-
quirement to eat marror on the first night of Passover. Rabbinic legislative authority
extends not only to enacting laws to protect against the violation of mitzvot, but also to
enacting affirmative laws. See.MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17; ELON, supra
note 16, at 481-83.
72. See TALMUD BAVLT, Pesachim 120a.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Outside of the Land of Israel, a rabbinically mandated seder is conducted on the
second night of Passover as well, at which the matzo and marror again must be eaten.
Another new circumstance could involve a somewhat reversed
situation, in which an object is discovered which had not been known
to exist but apparently may be suitable as the subject matter of a
mitzva. In the case of matzo, one such circumstance involves the type
of grain acceptable in the ingredients of matzo. The revealed law did
list a number of grains suitable for matzo,76 but did not address all
grains and indeed could not have meaningfully discussed those grains
not identifiable in the part of the world where the Torah was given.
Thus, the Talmud records that the legal authorities considered
whether an unaddressed grain could be used for matzo. 7 Faced with
the need to interpret the law, the authorities noted that a grain could
be used for matzo only if it could potentially undergo the chemical
reaction of leavening.78 They then performed an experiment on the
grains in question, and, through a comparison to the grains that were
known to be suitable, observed whether the unaddressed grains could
undergo the same chemical reaction.79 If so, those grains were deter-
mined to be suitable for matzo.80
A similar question arose in post-Talmudic times with regard to
marror. The Talmud lists a number of vegetables suitable to fulfill the
commandment to eat marror on the first night of Passover.81 The list
consists of a number of leafy vegetables, all of which were common in
the Middle East in the times of the Talmud. In later centuries, how-
ever, Jews were dispersed to many parts of the world, including areas
with colder climates that were not conducive to growing the leafy veg-
etables. In a sense, it would seem that the inability to obtain the veg-
etables listed in the Talmud presents a situation of destruction of the
subject matter of the mitzva. However, some legal authorities sug-
gested that it would be proper to use an available bitter vegetable,
even if it was not one of those listed in the Talmud. For example, in
76. See TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 35a; TALMUD YERUSHALMI, Chalah 1:1.
77. See TALMUD BAVLi, Pesachim 35a; TALMUD YERUSHALMI, Chalah 1:1.
78. The Talmud derives this rule from Deuteronomy 16:3.
79. See TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 35a; TALMUD YERUSHALMI, Chalah 1:1.
80. See TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 35a; TALMUD YERUSHALMI, Chalah 1:1.
81. Although the Torah's commandment to eat marror is currently no longer in effect
due to the destruction of the Temple and the resulting situation wherein the marror can no
longer be eaten together with the paschal lamb, the question of which vegetables can be
used for marror continues to have practical ramifications. Rabbinic legislation mandates
eating marror on the first night of Passover, even in the absence of the paschal lamb. See
supra note 71.
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the colder climates, the practice of using an available bitter vegetable,
horseradish, developed to fulfill the commandment to eat marror.s
A similar category of unaddressed circumstances necessitating
legal interpretation includes circumstances that actually were not in
existence at the time that the Torah was given. Such circumstances
usually arise through scientific discovery, and have been particularly
common in the past century. One issue that has presented legal au-
thorities with many questions is the application of electricity to the
laws of the Torah.
The question of electricity is particularly relevant to the laws of
the Sabbath. As noted above, a number of activities, which fall under
the category of melakha, are prohibited on the Sabbath. The Written
Torah appears to list explicitly only one such activity, lighting a fire,83
but through a combination of the revealed Oral Torah and textual in-
terpretation, legal authorities arrived at a total of thirty-nine catego-
ries of melakha, all of which include many sub-categories. 84 These
categories and sub-categories are considered d'oraita laws, and are
part of the Torah's definition of melakha.85
Twentieth century legal authorities were required to interpret the
many categories of melakha to determine whether various uses of
electricity were permitted on the Sabbath. 6 Some prohibited the ac-
tive use of electricity based on the finding that causing the flow of an
electric current is sufficiently similar to lighting a fire.' Others held
that completing an electrical circuit falls under the category of "build-
82. See generally Arthur Schaffer, The History of Horseradish as the Bitter Herb on
Passover, 8 GESHER 217 (1981). Professor Schaffer also cites conflicting opinions holding
that even in the absence of the leafy vegetables, horseradish may not be substituted.
The inability to obtain one of the vegetables listed in the Talmud has some similarities
to Greenawalt's example of a housekeeper who, due to certain factors, chooses to buy
chicken instead of following instructions to buy soupmeat. See generally Greenawalt, supra
note 62, manuscript at 19-23. While in the case of marror it was impossible to use the
proper vegetable, Greenawalt's discussions still seem relevant, including issues of "changed
circumstances," "radically changed circumstances," "carrying out" a directive, and a direc-
tive's "losing force." Id
Thus, even if the mitzva to eat marror is considered technically to "lose force" in the
absence of the proper vegetable, it is clearly only a temporary loss of force, until the proper
vegetable is available. See id. at 22. Similarly, while the Torah's commandments to eat
from the paschal lamb and the marror have temporarily lost force in the absence of the
Temple, when the Temple is rebuilt it will again be possible to fulfill these commandments.
83. See Exodus 35:3.
84. See TALMUD BAvL, Shabbath 73a.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
86. See generally Michael J. Broyde & Howard Jachter, The Use of Electricity on Shab-
bat and Yom Toy, 21 J. HALAcHA & Commmvp. Soc'y 4 (1991).
87. See id at 12.
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ing" a vessel or of "completing" a vessel so that it can serve its
function.'
Thuing on an electric light is even more likely to fall directly
under one of the categories of melakha. In terms of the prohibition
against burning a fire, the analogy of a glowing filament to a burning
fire is very strong. Alternatively, the Talmud extends another me-
lakha, cooking, to non-food objects, when the objects are softened as
a result of heat.89 Trning on an electric light may thus involve "cook-
ing" the filament.90
Questions about the status of electricity in Jewish law relate to
matzo as well. In addition to the requirements for matzo listed above,
the Talmud lists a number of conditions that must be met for matzo to
be suitable for fulfillment of the mitzva to eat matzo on the first night
of Passover. One such condition is that the person who bakes the
matzo must intend, when preparing the matzo, that the matzo be
eaten in fulfillment of the commandment. 91 When it became techno-
logically possible to bake matzos with machines rather than by hand,
legal authorities had to determine whether the intention requirement
could be satisfied through a machine. Some argued that because a
machine cannot have intent, the matzos baked by machine are not
suitable for the mitzva.92 Others argued that the intention require-
ment is satisfied if the individual who pushes the button to start the
machine has the proper intent.93
The example of the commandment to eat matzo on Passover thus
offers some insight into the nature of interpreting mitzvot. While
many of the basic details of the mitzvot were revealed through the
Written and Oral Torah and thus were not subject to interpretation,
other details were not included in the revealed law. When certain de-
tails of a law are not clear, there is a definite need for interpretation.
In addition, when circumstances arise that were not addressed by the
details given with the law, the only way to apply the law in a meaning-
ful way is through interpretation. This interpretation has the power
88. See id at 12-13.
89. See id. at 13.
90. It should be noted that beyond the Torah's categories of melakha, there are a
number of Rabbinically mandated prohibitions on the Sabbath, instituted by the Rabbis in
their role as legislators. Although the discussion here relates specifically to interpretation
of laws in the Torah, a number of Rabbinically mandated laws may also be interpreted to
prohibit the active use of electricity on the Sabbath. See id.
91. See TALMUD BAVLI, Pesachim 38b.
92. See Hershel Schachter, Ma'ase U'grama B'halakha, 1 BErr YosEF SHAUL 70
(1985).
93. See id.
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either to extend or to limit the parameters of the law, vis-a-vis the new
circumstances.
There are, however, extensive checks on the extent to which legal
interpretation can place limitations on the scope of a commandment.
The Talmud records a dispute concerning whether interpreters may
limit the applicability of a mitzva based on a consideration of the ap-
parent rationale underlying the mitzva.94 Rabbi Shimon held that it is
proper to determine the reason for a particular commandment and
then to determine whether this reason applies under a given set of
circumstances; if the reason does not apply, then the commandment
does not apply.95 Rabbi Yehuda, however, whose opinion is followed,
held that a mitzva must always be observed, even if the apparent rea-
son for the mitzva does not seem relevant under the circumstances.9 6
Thus, the Talmud concludes that, absent express support in the
Written or Oral Torah, legal authorities may not find mitzvot inappli-
cable under circumstances that are simply unusual but not new. If the
law on its face is concrete to the extent that it covers a set of circum-
stances, there is no room for interpretation. Authorities are precluded
from suggesting that because the rationale that appears to be the basis
of a commandment does not apply to a given individual or social set-
ting, then the commandment itself does not apply.
The Talmud records the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and
Rabbi Yehuda with respect to a number of commandments. For ex-
ample, the Torah discusses the laws concerning the taking of security
on a loan. The Torah requires that if a creditor takes an item of cloth-
ing as security from a poor person who possesses only one set of
clothes for each day and night, then the creditor must go to the
debtor's house and return the clothing each time it is to be worn. 97
The Torah also states that a creditor may never take the clothing of a
widow as security.98 Rabbi Shimon held that the rationale for the sec-
ond law was based on the first law.99 He deduced that the reason the
Torah prohibited taking a widow's clothes as security is that, if the
widow is poor, the creditor will have to go daily to the widow's house,
holding her clothes in his hands, and concluded that the Torah prohib-
ited such conduct to prevent the appearance of impropriety. 100 Rabbi
94. TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 21a.
95. See id
96. See id.
97. See Deuteronomy 24:13.
98. See id. at 24:17.
99. See TALMUD BAvLI, Bava Metzia l15a.
100. See id
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Shimon concluded that if a given widow is not poor, and therefore the
rationale he found for the commandment does not apply, then the
commandment itself does not apply, and the creditor may take a piece
of the widow's clothing as security.1 1
Rabbi Yehuda, however, held that the applicability of a mitzva
does not depend on the reason for the mitzva.1°2 The Torah's words
are clear on their face: it is prohibited to take the clothing of a widow
as security for a loan.10 3 When the words of a commandment are
clear, the commandment is applied as stated, even under unusual cir-
cumstances. Unlike electricity, which raised new questions of inter-
pretation regarding the Sabbath and matzo, there already existed
widows, clothing and loans at the time that the Torah was given. Per-
haps the law prohibiting taking a widow's garment appears particu-
larly sensible if the widow is poor. Perhaps it was also unusual at the
time the Torah was given for a widow to possess more than a single
garment for either day or night. Even if these propositions are cor-
rect, the mitzvot, when stated clearly and unequivocally, are not de-
pendent on circumstances such as these.'0 4
Nor is the applicability of definitely stated mitzvot dependent on
individual psychological factors. For example, the Torah states that
eating the matzo is to be a reminder of the haste with which the Na-
tion of Israel fled Egypt;10 5 because the people had to hurry, there was
no time to allow the bread to leaven, resulting in the unleavened
matzo. Yet, one may suggest additional reasons for the command-
ment to eat matzo on Passover. Indeed, a central part of the Passover
seder is the explanation for why matzo is eaten. Some of these rea-
sons focus on eating matzo, symbolic of the bread of the poor, to
evoke feelings of the hardships suffered in slavery in Egypt. It is pos-
sible, however, that an individual would feel, on a personal level, that
eating matzo does not contribute to the commemoration of slavery.
To the contrary, an individual may enjoy the taste of the matzo. Such
an individual is nevertheless required to eat matzo on Passover, be-
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Deuteronomy 24:17
104. The attempt to discover a rationale for mitzvot is generally considered a noble
pursuit. For example, Maimonides writes that it is proper to contemplate the mitzvot and if
possible to suggest reasons for them. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at
Laws of Temurah 4:13. Nevertheless, Maimonides stresses that if an individual is unable to
discover a rationale for a particular mitzva, he or she should recognize that there is still a
Divine rationale for it. See id. at Laws of Me'ilah 8:8.
105. See Deuteronomy 16:3.
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cause the obligation to perform the mitzva is not dependent on the
apparent rationale for the mitzva. °6
Thus, it can be stated as a general rule that interpretation cannot
restrict the scope of a mitzva to fewer circumstances than are implied
by the plain meaning of the mitzva. At most, if the mitzva is not clear
or if a new circumstance arises, Rabbinic authorities may logically de-
cide not to extend the mitzva beyond the scope of its plain meaning.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that the application of
a clearly stated mitzva is not dependent on the relevance of its ration-
ale to a given set of circumstances. The Talmud states that if the To-
rah itself expressly states the reason for a mitzva in the text of the
mitzva, then the application of that mitzva is regulated by the rele-
vance of the reason. 0 7 For example, the Torah commands a king not
to obtain "too many" horses.'08 While the phrase "too many" must be
interpreted, the command on its face clearly prohibits categorically
the acquisition of too many horses. In the text of the command, how-
ever, the Torah supplies the rationale for this commandment; it con-
tinues, "lest he return the nation back to the Land of Egypt, to obtain
horses." 0 9 The Talmud notes that in discussing most mitzvot, the To-
rah does not provide a reason; in the rare case that a reason is given,
that reason qualifies the law." 0 Thus, the command stating that "a
king should not obtain too many horses lest he return the nation to
Egypt" is understood to mean that "a king should not obtain too
106. A similar analysis applies to marror. As noted above, it is preferable to use for
marror the vegetables listed in the Talmud. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82. One
of these vegetables is romaine lettuce, which has a bitter root. Some individuals, faced
with the choice of eating romaine lettuce or horseradish, may feel that the best way to
fulfill the mitzva of eating bitter herbs is to eat the food which is more bitter, the horserad-
ish. Although these individuals correctly note that the rationale for the mitzva to eat bitter
herbs on Passover is to recall the bitterness of slavery in Egypt, the text of the command-
ment does not indicate that it is preferable to eat a more bitter food. Therefore, the Tal-
mud's authoritative list of preferable foods should be followed over a food that may seem
to better match the rationale of the mitzva.
In a sense, questions about the relationship between a mitzva's rationale and its per-
formance relate to issues of the spirit of the law and the letter of the law. Jewish belief
certainly recognizes the importance of the spirit of the law. Thus, even in the absence of an
express textual requirement or prohibition, certain activities can be required or prohibited.
See, e.g., 2 NACHMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 115-16, 376 (Chaim Chavel ed.,
1960) (commenting on Leviticus 19:2 and Deuteronomy 6:18). The principle expressed by
Rabbi Yehuda seems to be that, ordinarily, the spirit of the law may not supplant the letter
of the law, to relieve a person from an obligation or prohibition.
107. See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 21a.
108. Deuteronomy 17:16.
109. Id
110. See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 21a.
many horses if he will thereby return the nation back to Egypt." If it
is clear that he will not lead the nation back to Egypt, then this com-
mandment does not limit how many horses he may obtain."'
Nevertheless, there is one caveat. In theory, the Talmud does li-
cense restricting the scope of certain mitzvot to fewer situations than
implied by the plain meaning of the mitzvot. In practice, however, the
Talmud does not seem to recommend that a person be so confident
that the rationale that the Torah gives for a mitzva truly does not ap-
ply.112 In fact, the Talmud notes that the wise Solomon felt that he
was not in danger of returning to Egypt if he obtained too many hor-
ses.1 3 As the Bible records, however, Solomon obtained many horses
and as a result, returned to Egypt.1 4 The case of Solomon illustrates
the danger that a person may erroneously believe that the rationale
behind a mitzva does not apply and may then unjustifiably conclude
that the mitzva does not apply. 115
111. Interestingly, the rules about when mitzvot may or may not be limited through
interpretation may parallel Judge Easterbrook's rule of when a statute should or should
not be interpreted. Judge Easterbrook wrote that
[U]nless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of
common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated
by its framers and expressly resolved in the text. Unless the party relying on the
statute could establish either express resolution or creation of the common law
power of revision, the court would hold the matter in question outside the stat-
ute's domain. The statute would become irrelevant, the parties (and court) remit-
ted to whatever other sources of law might be applicable.
Frank A. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 533, 544 (1983). The cases
Easterbrook considers to be within the domain of a statute may parallel those cases in
which mitzvot are applied as stated, with no possibility of restricting the scope of the
mitzva based on interpretation. The cases that he considers to be outside the statute's
domain may parallel the new or unaddressed circumstances, which require interpretation
of the mitzvot, though in these scenarios Easterbrook opts for non-application. Finally,
Easterbrook's discussion of a statute's handing the court the power to revise the common
law may parallel the cases in which the reasons for the mitzvot are expressly incorporated
into the mitzvot, allowing for restrictive interpretation.
112. See TALMUD BAvLI, Sanhedrin 21a.
113. See id.
114. See 1 Kings 10:29. To use Greenawalt's terms, at best it may be said that Solomon
"innocently" or "justifiably" failed to comply with the commandment, as he may have
reasonably believed, based on the express rationale for the commandment, that the com-
mandment was inapplicable to him. Greenawalt, supra note 62, manuscript at 36-37. How-
ever, with regard to most commandments for which the Torah does not reveal the
rationale, failure to comply based on a presumed rationale is never justified. Nor would
such behavior be considered a "mistaken" failure to comply; it would simply be a case of
disobedience. See id.
115. Indeed, the Talmud cites the case of Solomon to explain why the Torah did not
reveal the rationale behind most of the mitzvot. See TALUDm BAVLi, Sanhedrin.21a. The
Talmud observes that Solomon, one of the wisest and most righteous of individuals, none-
theless erred in believing that the rationale of the mitzva did not apply to him. See id. The
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2. Principles
The other category of laws found in the Torah includes those that
do not discuss what actions a person must or must not undertake, but
instead prescribe various legal principles for the way society should
function. Generally, these laws relate more to monetary or "civil"
matters,116 while mitzvot usually refer more to ritual or technically
"religious" matters. It should be remembered, however, that although
Jewish law differentiates between monetary and ritual law, it is less
than accurate to use the term "religious law" exclusively for ritual law.
As implied by the very phrase "Jewish law," as well as by the fact that
the Torah contains both monetary and ritual laws, these two areas of
law together comprise the law of the Jewish religion. Moreover, many
areas of "civil law," such as marriage, involve religious ritual-often
mitzvot-as well as monetary principles."
7
On the whole, however, most of what we would categorize as
monetary matters can at least be analyzed and interpreted with little
reference to ritual law. Compared with mitzvot, these matters usually
require considerably more interpretation and allow for considerably
more discretion on the part of interpreters. This increased interpreta-
tion and discretion result from both the form and the substantive na-
ture of the monetary laws.
In terms of form, these laws are often expressed as general legal
principles, without much specific elaboration in the revealed Oral
Law. The principles, therefore, must be interpreted to establish con-
crete rules for society. In the category of mitzvot, although certain
concrete details are revealed in both the Written and Oral Law, some
details are left to interpretation. For example, the revealed law was
specific in stating that matzo is an unleavened, baked mixture of grain
and water, and in setting the quantity of matzo that must be eaten on
the first night of Passover." 8 Yet, the revealed law was general
enough to be open to interpretation with regard to the time limit for
eating the matzo and questions related to new circumstances. 19 Thus,
with regard to the form of the law, it seems that the central difference
Talmud reasons that, had the Torah given the rationale for other commandments, it would
have led others to commit similar errors. See id.; see also MAIMONIDES, BOOK OF COM-
MANDMENTs, negative commandment 365.
116. The term "monetary law" is a rough translation of the Hebrew term dine! mam-
mon, which refers to a broad range of civil laws, including commercial law, contract law,
and other laws implemented for social welfare.
117. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
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between monetary laws and mitzvot is the level of generality. Because
monetary laws are more general, they require more interpretation.
It is possible that this difference in form is itself an expression of
the difference in substantive nature between mitzvot and monetary
law. Mitzvot involve ritualistic activities that reflect an often unarticu-
lated and sometimes undiscernible Divine will. Therefore, while some
interpretation is possible, through textual analysis or use of the inter-
nal logic of mitzvot, there are limits to the understanding attainable
through any method of rational human interpretation. In contrast,
while the monetary legal principles in the Torah also express Divine
will, they are readily comprehensible through human logic. Given
general monetary principles, humans can employ a meaningful and
broad form of rational interpretation to construct a legal system that
applies those principles.
This difference in substantive nature may likewise account for the
difference in discretion available to interpreters in the two areas.
With regard to mitzvot, when the Torah does not reveal the Divine
rationale for a mitzva, interpreters do not have the discretion to re-
strict the scope of the mitzva based on the rationale. 120 When consid-
ering monetary principles, however, interpreters deal with a Divine
yet rational system, subject by its nature to broad and extensive ra-
tional interpretation. Because the system is inherently rational, it may
be interpreted, applied, and restricted through an exploration of the
rationale underlying the principles. If interpreters find that the ration-
ale behind a particular principle does not apply in a given case, they
have the discretion to decide that the principle itself does not apply.' 2'
120. See supra text accompanying notes 94-115.
121. In discussing levels of abstraction in law, Bernard Jackson has written that
Ronald Dworkin... attributes to "legal principles" the role of guidance only;
unlike rules, they do not dictate the outcome of problems to which they apply.
Interestingly, the strict distinction proposed by Dworkin between "principles"
and "rules," and with it the strict distinction between the roles of guidance and
determination, has been heavily attacked in jurisprudential literature, on the
grounds that they are matters of degree rather than quality.
Bernard S. Jackson, Modem Research in Jewish Law: Some Theoretical Issues, in MODERN
RESEARCH IN JEWISH LAW 136, 153 (Bernard S. Jackson ed., 1980) (citations omitted).
In Jewish law, monetary laws generally provide guidance, while ritual laws generally
dictate outcomes. In a sense, however, this distinction is largely one of degree, as even
ritual laws often require further interpretation. Yet, on a fundamental level, the distinction
is one of quality, as ritual law is not only more specific and concrete, but leaves relatively
little room for judicial discretion. As the sixteenth century scholar Rabbi Judah Loew of
Prague (Maharal) put it:
The monetary laws and ... the ritual laws are distinct from one another... [and]
with regard to the monetary laws, it is necessary to understand the [logical] source
of the law.., which depends on a logical understanding of the basis of the law...
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Here again, it is helpful to look at some specific laws to illustrate
how monetary principles are interpreted. The Torah's system of tort
law discusses not only liability for damages caused directly by a per-
son's actions but also the liability for damages caused by a person's
property. 22 The framework for the laws of the latter category is
based largely on a few verses in Exodus which list four general tort
scenarios: (1) a person digs a pit in which another person's animal
falls and dies;123 (2) one person's ox gores another's ox, killing it;124
(3) a person sends an animal to graze in someone else's field; and (4) a
fire consumes someone's field.'2 5 The Torah also lists the various
forms of compensation appropriate to each of these cases. These sce-
narios, which are clearly broad examples rather than a comprehensive
list, themselves require much interpretation.
Any student of the law will recognize that there are numerous
issues that must be resolved to arrive at even a basic framework for
adjudicating cases covered by these principles. The Talmud engages
in interpretation of many of the conceptual principles that can be
gleaned from these examples, and through a combination of textual
hermeneutics and logical analysis arrives at certain concrete laws. A
look at even a few of these issues reveals certain parallels to issues
common in American tort law. The Talmud's discussion of damages
caused by an animal addresses, for example, such issues as the duty of
care imposed on owners of specific animals and how far the duty ex-
tends. 26 The Talmud extends the example of the digging of a pit to
scenarios involving people who place various obstacles in a public
place. 27 Regarding the fire scenario, the Talmud discusses questions
of causation. 28 In addition, the Talmud contains an extensive analysis
of systems of compensation for each kind of tort. 29 Finally, in the
real world, there is an endless variety of complex fact patterns to
a logic that is not written in the Torah. Those monetary laws which are written in
the Torah are only the basic rules of law, but not every dealing between individu-
als is written in the Torah.
MAHARAL, DEREKH HACHAYIM 21.
Greenawalt's analysis of "abstract and specific purposes" of directives also appears to
be relevant to this discussion. Greenawalt, supra note 62, manuscript at 24-26.
122. See Exodus 21:28-36, 22:4-5.
123. See id. at 21:33.
124. See id. at 21:35.
125. See id. at 22:6.
126. See generally TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Kama, chs. 1-6.
127. See id. at ch. 3.
128. See, e.g., id. at 22a-24a.
129. See generally TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Kama.
which the general legal principles must be applied; the Talmud is filled
with considerations of many of them.130
Because the Talmudic discussions are all an attempt to apply the
principles found in the text of the Torah, there are certain constraints
on the discretion available to interpreters. The conclusions must fit
broadly within the framework set by the text. Yet within this frame-
work there is much room for human logic to decide such concrete
issues as what standard of care should be required toward specific ani-
mals. Conclusions in such matters are possible only through identify-
ing the conceptual principles underlying the textual laws and applying
them to the myriad of scenarios not present in the text. In contrast to
mitzvot, which generally are not interpreted through an examination
of the conceptual issues behind the rituals, tort law can only be ap-
plied through consideration of the conceptual principles behind the
generally stated rules.
Another example of the Torah's monetary laws is the law of bail-
ments. The Torah provides general principles for bailments, listing
different types of bailments and the corresponding duties of care re-
quired. The first scenario listed in the Torah involves a bailee who is
liable if the goods are lost or destroyed as a result of the bailee's "neg-
ligence," but not if the goods are "stolen." The Talmud interprets this
scenario as referring to a gratuitous bailee. In the Torah's second sce-
nario, the bailee is liable for stolen goods as well, but not in a case of
duress. This scenario, according to the Talmud, refers to a bailment
for hire or a rental agreement. In the final scenario, the Torah states
that a person who borrows an object is liable even in the case of
duress. 13
1
Again, the Talmud engages in extensive interpretation in order to
apply these general principles to more concrete situations. There are
many basic variables within each of the Torah's scenarios, such as the
nature and quantity of the goods. The text contains terms, such as
"negligence" and "duress," whose definitions will depend in part on
these variables. Arriving at definitions may involve a certain degree
of textual analysis but will depend largely on rational conceptions of
fairness and justice.'32
130. See generally id.
131. See Exodus 22:6-14; see also TALMUD BAVL, Bava Metzia chs. 3, 7, 8.
132. In addition, the definition of "negligence" or "duress" is largely measured by the
common standards of care, which may vary according to time and place. Thus, interpreta-
tion of these principles usually follows Cardozo's prescription:
[W]e look to custom.., for the tests and standards that are to determine how
established rules shall be applied.... The master in the discharge of his duty to
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Moreover, unlike the mitzvot, which are definite and permanent
reflections of Divine will and logic, not subject to human modification,
the Torah's monetary laws are essentially guidelines which not only
depend in part on human logic, but can be modified by human will.
Ritual areas are considered to be in G-d's province; mitzvot are state-
ments of what actions and activities must or must not be performed.
While many of the mitzvot relate to the way a person treats others, the
duty to perform the mitzvot is ultimately a duty to G-d. Therefore, it
is outside human discretion to relieve a person of this duty. Monetary
issues, in contrast, are subject to human convention. Therefore, the
Taimud states individuals have broad discretion over monetary
matters.
133
For example, a creditor has the discretion to forgive a debt, even
if that debt is mandated by the Torah.3' Similarly, if a person sustains
damages to himself or to property because of a pit that has been dug
in a public place, the Torah states that the person who dug the pit is
liable. 135 Yet the victim has the discretion to forgive the debt.' 36
protect the servant against harm must exercise the degree of care that is com-
monly exercised in like circumstances by men of ordinary prudence. The triers of
the facts in determining whether that standard has been attained, must consult
the habits of life, the everyday beliefs and practices, of the men and women about
them.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss 60, 63 (1921).
133. See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Metzia 84a. The difference between ritual and
monetary obligation is roughly similar to the difference between criminal and civil liability.
A guilty criminal defendant has committed a crime against the people of the state. There-
fore, it is the people of the state, and not the individual victim of the crime, who prosecute
the criminal defendant. While the victim may often be in a position to prevent a criminal
prosecution by refusing to testify, the ultimate decision of whether to prosecute a defend-
ant is in the discretion of the prosecutor, as the representative of the people. The victim
may not "forgive" the crime; it was committed against the people as a whole, not against
the victim on a personal level. Similarly, ritual obligations, though they may manifest
themselves in actions that relate to other people, are ultimately obligations toward G-d.
By contrast, a victim of a tort may forgive civil obligation. The State has an interest in
the satisfaction of civil liability, and failure to pay the damage award may result in criminal
prosecution by the State, but if the plaintiff forgives the liability, the State has no grounds
to prosecute. In Jewish law, if a defendant fails to fulfill a monetary obligation, the defend-
ant thereby violates ritual prohibitions, such as those against stealing or withholding wages.
If the plaintiff forgives the obligation, however, there are no grounds for a violation of
ritual law.
Similarly, adjudication of questions of monetary law will often determine whether
there is a violation of ritual law. As the twentieth century scholar Rabbi Shimon Shkop
observed, "The law against stealing prohibits taking something that, according to monetary
law, belongs to someone else; the law against withholding a worker's wages refers to that
which must be paid according to monetary law." SHIMON SHKOP, SHA'AREI YOSHER 5:1.
134. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Sales 5:11.
135. See Exodus 21:33-34.
136. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Sales 5:11.
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Likewise, individuals have discretion to place conditions on activ-
ities relating to monetary matters. In the case of the gratuitous bail-
ment, according to the Torah's guidelines, the bailee is liable if the
goods are lost or destroyed as a result of the bailee's negligence but
not if the goods are stolen. The bailee and bailiff have discretion,
however, to contract that the bailee will be liable if the goods are sto-
len as well.' 37
In contrast, in ritual areas, individuals do not have the same dis-
cretion in relation to the performance of the dictates of the Torah.
For example, the Torah's prescription for divorce proceedings includes
the requirement that a husband give his wife a get, or writ of di-
vorce.138 That the wife may not marry again until she has received a
get is a ritual matter; her duty not to remarry without obtaining a get is
owed not to her husband but to G-d. Therefore, the husband does not
have control over the ritualistic mechanics of a get. The husband may
not "forgive" the requirement of a get by allowing his wife to remarry
without obtaining a get from him.
Similarly, a condition may not be placed on the ritual characteris-
tics of a get. Therefore, a husband could not give his wife a get with
the stipulation that she may not marry a particular man. Even if she
were to agree to a such a stipulation, the get would not be valid. This
is because the ritual law defines a get as that which permits a woman
to marry whomever she wants;139 it is not within the province of a
particular husband and wife to change the ritual function of a get. In
the same way, a person does not have discretion to decide to eat a
smaller quantity of matzo than the amount required by the Torah.
It should be noted, however, that ritual areas sometimes have
monetary characteristics as well, which may be subject to conditions.
In the case of the get, for example, the mechanics of conveying the
physical get are based on monetary principles. Although a husband
may be compelled under certain circumstances to give his wife a get,
ritual law does not dictate the details of the monetary aspect of the
conveyance of a get. Therefore, a husband may place certain condi-
tions on the conveyance of the get. In fact, the Talmud records that in
the time of King David, before going to battle, husbands would pres-
ent their wives with a get, subject to their not returning from battle
within a stated period of time.'40 This would prevent the possibility of
137. See TALMUD BAvLi, Bava Metzia 84a.
138. See Deuteronomy 24:1.
139. See TALMUD BAVLx, Gittin 81a-81b.
140. See TALMUD BvLi, Kethuboth 9b.
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a wife becoming an agunah, a woman prohibited from remarrying be-
cause she does not know if her husband is still alive.' 4'
Finally, monetary laws are considered in the province of humans
to such an extent that they are often developed independent of any
text, depending wholly on human custom and convention. 42 Many
monetary laws are based largely on observation of business custom
and human nature. The details of how best to form a legal structure to
manage these human practices are totally within the discretion of
human authorities, subject only to the Torah's general commands for
justice and fairness. 43
C. Authority in Interpretation
In one sense, Jewish law does not recognize the unique authority
of a particular individual or body to interpret the law. Because the
source of Jewish law is the Torah, which represents the revealed will
of G-d, legal interpretation is a discipline aimed at discovering G-d's
will in issues and cases for which the Torah has not provided compre-
141. The distinction between monetary and ritual law is important in applying the Tal-
mudic rule dina de-malkhuta dina-the law of the land is the law. Under Jewish law, the
secular law of a valid government is binding, to the extent that it relates to monetary law.
The law of the land does not have authority, however, to contradict ritual law. See ELON,
supra note 16, at 132-37; Rabbi Hershel Schachter, "Dina de-malkhuta Dina": Secular Law
as a Religious Obligation, 1 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'y 103 (1981).
The rule that a secular law has the authority to regulate only monetary issues compli-
cates the drafting of get laws, which are designed to insure that a husband will grant a get to
his wife if the couple undergoes a civil divorce. Under Jewish law, without obtaining a get,
the woman may not remarry. See Deuteronomy 24:1-2; TALMUD BAVLI, Kedushin 2a.
Statutes must be drafted carefully to affect only the monetary aspects of the conveyance of
a get, not the ritual laws involved. Similar restrictions apply to prenuptial agreements,
through which a future husband agrees to certain terms to insure that, in the event of
divorce, he will provide his future wife with a get. As noted above, a husband may agree to
conditions on the monetary aspects relating to the conveyance of the get but not to condi-
tions affecting the ritual validity of the get. For a discussion of the legal and religious issues
relating to get laws, see generally IRVING A. BRErrowrrz, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELiGIOUS
LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCmTY (1993), and Irving A.
Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract and the First Amend-
ment, 51 MD. L. REv. 312 (1992).
142. See CHAixs, supra note 27, at 312.
143. Cf. CARDOZO, supra note 132, at 62-63 ("General standards of right and duty are
established. Custom must determine whether there has been adherence or departure....
Innumerable ... are the cases where the course of dealing to be followed is defined by the
customs, or, more properly speaking, the usages of a particular trade or market or profes-
sion.") (citation omitted).
As a nineteenth century scholar noted, the Torah allows judges to interpret most laws
of monetary litigation according to their own judgment, subject only to a single general
rule that "you shall judge your fellow with justice." Israel Lifschitz, Commentary to Bava
Bathra, in TmERnETH YISRAEL 10:8 (citing Leviticus 19:15).
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hensive details. Even in monetary matters, and even in those areas of
monetary law based largely on human custom and behavior, the goal
of an interpreter is to arrive at what would be considered a just result
according to Divine will. This element of religious morality, so central
to Jewish law, suggests that there should not be an interpretive au-
thority in Jewish law. As Joseph Raz has written, "[m]orality is not
based on authority."'144
As indicated by its very title, however, Jewish law is not simply a
"religiously based system[ ] of moral theorizing.' 145 Jewish law con-
sists of a detailed legal system, regulating both public and private life,
to a far greater extent than would be acceptable in American law. In
short, Jewish law presents at least guidelines for virtually every aspect
of ideal societal and personal behavior. As a practical matter, then,
there is a definite need for an authoritative interpretation of the law
to determine how society should function.
The tension between Jewish law's emphasis on the search for
"Truth," or G-d's will, and the need to adapt the theoretical law to the
practical needs of a functioning society, expresses itself in some of the
principles relating to authority in Jewish law. The tension, in fact, is
grounded in the interpretation of the following passage in the Torah:
[W]hen there is a matter of law that you are unable to de-
cide... you will go up to the place that G-d will choose. And
you will approach the.., judge who will be in those days and
you will inquire, and [he] will tell you the law. And you will act
according to that which 1he] tell[s] you. 146
Based on the presumption against superfluity, the Talmud asks why
the Torah adds the phrase "who will be in those days" in reference to
the judge who is to be approached. The Talmud also asks rhetorically
whether it would be possible for a person living in a certain generation
to approach any judge other than one who lives in "those days." The
144. Joseph Raz, Why Interpret? 13 (Oct. 19, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
145. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx.
L. REv. 35, 58 (1981). As Fried characterized it,
The closest moral philosophy has come to the forms and methods peculiar to law
has been some religiously based systems of moral theorizing, such as the Talmudic
or Thomistic.... Where they assume the function of public judgment with pub-
lic-sometimes even coercive-consequences ... they begin to display the very
characteristics that I ascribe to law. Indeed, they become just specialized systems
of law.
Ld. Though Judge Fried ultimately recognizes a Talmudic "system of law," it seems odd
that he appears reluctant to do so, stating only that the Talmudic system begins to "display
the ... characteristics" of law.
146. Deuteronomy 17:8-10.
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Talmud interprets the verses to teach that a person should recognize
that the judges of each generation are entrusted with the responsibil-
ity and authority to interpret the law.147 In fact, even if the courts in a
certain generation do not appear to be of the same caliber as those of
another generation, each court must rely on its own interpretation of
the law. 48 Therefore, as legal conclusions must be based on an under-
standing of truth, a court need not accept as inherently authoritative
another court's interpretation.
Maimonides codified this principle in his Code of Law. He wrote
that if one court arrives at a legal ruling based on a certain reasoning,
a later court has the discretion to adjudicate the same issue differently,
based on its own reasoning1 49 As a source, Maimonides cited the
verse "to the judge who will be in those days" and commented that
"you are required to approach only the court in your day." 5 0
Yet, while granting a court discretion to disagree with the ruling
of an earlier court, the Torah also limits the discretion of an individual
judge to disagree with the court's ruling. The Torah states that the
court's ruling is authoritative: "according to the teaching which they
instruct you and according to the law which they tell you, you will act;
do not veer from that which they tell you, to the right or to the
left.' 15 ' In fact, the Torah prohibits rulings that contradict the court's
ruling.' 52 The Talmud explains that this law was required to maintain
unity in the Nation. 53
Again, Maimonides codified these laws, in a discussion of the ju-
dicial structure and the method of adjudicating questions of interpre-
tation in Jewish law. 54 In its ideal state, the judiciary of the Jewish
legal system consists of a hierarchy of courts, which includes lower
courts, higher courts, and the Sanhedrin.' 55 The difference in judicial
function is based primarily on jurisdiction. 56 Unlike the American
judicial system, ordinarily there is no formal process to appeal a lower
court decision to a higher court.1 57 Instead, certain matters are in the
147. See TALMUD BAVLI, Rosh Hashana 25b.
148. See id., especially the Tosafoth commentary.
149. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAw, supra note 17, at Laws of Mamrim 2:1 (quoting
Deuteronomy 17:8-10).
150. Id.
151. Deuteronomy 17:11.
152. See id. at 17:12.
153. See TALMUD BAVLr, Sanhedrin 88b.
154. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAw, supra note 17, at Laws of Sanhedrin chs. 1, 5.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 6:1-5.
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exclusive jurisdiction of the lower courts, while other matters are in
the jurisdiction of the higher courts. 58
The Sanhedrin, in this system, had a unique status. In addition to
having jurisdiction over issues of a certain level of importance, the
Sanhedrin was the final arbiter of all questions of law.' 59 When a
question arose that could not be answered by a lower court, the ques-
tion was then referred to a higher court.16° If the higher court could
not arrive at a decision-"a matter of law that you are unable to de-
cide"-then the question was presented to the Sanhedrin for a deci-
sion.161 The decision reached by the majority of the Sanhedrin was
binding on the entire nation. Thus, as a practical matter, the Sanhe-
drin was the ultimate authority of legal interpretation. 62
Another Medieval scholar, Nachmanides, elaborated on the Tal-
mud's rationale for the principle that the Sanhedrin's ruling is not sub-
ject to dispute.' 63 Nachmanides explained that, in giving courts the
authority to interpret the Written Torah, G-d knew that there would
be disagreements.' 64 Indeed, Nachmanides noted an inherent differ-
ence between legal reasoning and the logic of exact sciences, such as
engineering.1 65 While it is possible in engineering to prove demon-
strably, with mathematical precision, that a particular theory is cor-
rect, legal reasoning often involves issues that can be resolved
logically in more than one way. The role of a legal interpreter is to
examine the evidence motivating each of the possible conclusions, and
to determine which conclusion appears most accurate. 66
158. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Sanhedrin chs. 1, 5.
159. See iL at Laws of Mamrim 1:1.
160. See id. at 1:4.
161. lId; see also Deuteronomy 17:8.
162. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Mamrim 1:1.
163. See NACHMANIDES, Introduction to Commentary on Rif
164. See id.
165. See id
166. See id. Cardozo similarly recognized that certain cases lend themselves to more
than one viable interpretation and that in these cases a judge must balance different con-
siderations to arrive at a conclusion:
It is with these cases that I have chiefly concerned myself in all that I have said to
you. In a sense it is true of many of them that they may be decided either way.
By that I mean that reasons plausible and fairly persuasive might be found for
one conclusion as for another. Here come into play that balancing of judgment,
that testing and sorting of considerations of analogy and logic and utility and
fairness ....
CARDOZO, supra note 132, at 165-66. Professor Owen Fiss also has noted that interpreta-
tion is not an exact science: "[T]he meaning of a text does not reside in the text, as an
object might reside in physical space or as an element might be said to be present in a
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The possibility of numerous logical conclusions can be problem-
atic. While in theory, proponents of each of these conclusions have a
logical claim to a correct interpretation, in practice, there must be one
rule of law for society to follow. If all logical conclusions are accepted
as valid rulings, Nachmanides wrote, there will no longer be a single
"Torah" for the nation to follow; instead, it will be replaced by "many
Torahs."167 To prevent this possibility, and to provide for a unified
rule of law, G-d commanded that when there is indecision about an
issue, the High Court functions as the ultimate and unifying decisor. 68
The tension between legal interpreters' search for the truth and
the need for a practical method of establishing the law is expressed
perhaps most dramatically in a narrative in the Talmud that for centu-
ries has received the attention of scholars of Jewish law, and more
recently has been examined by a number of contemporary American
legal scholars. 169 The Talmud refers to a dispute between Rabbi
chemical compound, ready to be extracted if only one knows the correct process ....
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 744 (1982).
The imprecise nature of legal decision necessitates what Cardozo called "the serious
business of a judge." CARDOZO, supra note 132, at 21. Cardozo criticized those judges
whose "notion of their duty is to match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of
many sample cases spread out upon their desk," id. at 20, and wrote that, according to such
a view, "[t]he man who had the best card index of cases would also be the wisest judge," id.
at 21. According to Cardozo, judges must decide cases "when the colors do not match,
when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent." Id.
A contemporary scholar of Jewish law, who is also a professor of American law, has
updated Cardozo's observation in applying it to Jewish law. Rabbi J. David Bleich writes
that effective decision-making in Jewish law "lies precisely in the ability to make judgment
calls in evaluating citations, precedents, arguments, etc. It is not sufficient... to have a full
command of relevant sources. If so, in theory at least, the decisor par excellence would be
a computer rather than a person." 4 J. DAVID BLEicH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC
PROBLEMS at ix (1995).
167. See 2 NACHMANIDES, supra note 106, at 423 (commenting on Deuteronomy 17:11).
168. See id.; cf. Fiss, supra note 166, at 747 ("[A] hierarchy of authority for resolving
disputes that could potentially divide or destroy an interpretive community is one of the
distinctive features of legal interpretation.").
In the poetic language of Robert Cover,
It is the problem of the multiplicity of meaning ... that leads at once to the
imperial virtues and the imperial mode of world maintenance.... Let loose, un-
fettered, the worlds created would be unstable and sectarian in their social organ-
ization, dissociative and incoherent in their discourse, wary and violent in their
interactions. The sober imperial mode of world maintenance holds the mirror of
critical objectivity to meaning, [and] imposes the discipline of institutional justice
upon norms ....
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1983). Cover identified similar arguments in The Federalist for a
national supreme court. See id. at 41.
169. Stone has referred to this narrative as "possibly the most frequently cited talmudic
passage in modem literature." Stone, supra note 1, at 855. Stone's article focuses on Rob-
Eliezer and the majority of Sages. In order to demonstrate that he
was correct, the Talmud states, Rabbi Eliezer summoned a number of
miraculous events, culminating in a Heavenly voice declaring that
Rabbi Eliezer's view was correct. 170 The Sages responded by noting
that, the Heavenly voice notwithstanding, the Torah instructs that in
adjudicating a matter, the majority view is followed. 171 The law is
"not in heaven," but instead was given to humans to determine. 72
Therefore, the law was interpreted according to the view of the major-
ity of Sages, against the view of Rabbi Eliezer.
This narrative has been analyzed in numerous ways, but on a ba-
sic level, the narrative serves as an illustration of the tension between
searching for truth and following conventions of decision-making. If
the Heavenly voice is viewed as reflecting the Divine "opinion" re-
garding the dispute, then Rabbi Eliezer was the one who seems to
have accurately interpreted the Divine will. Indeed, as Rabbenu Nis-
sim Gerondi (Ran), a medieval legal authority, explained, the Sages
acknowledged that Rabbi Eliezer's opinion was "closer to the
truth."'1 73 Yet, they followed the majority opinion.' 74 Ran explained
that "the determination of the law was entrusted to the sages of each
generation," regardless of whether their determination is consistent
with the "truth."'175
This narrative need not suggest, however, that the majority opin-
ion was in some sense "false." As Nachmanides noted, legal reason-
ert Cover's use of sources from Jewish law in many of his later pieces, including Nomos
and Narrative, which cites the aforementioned narrative in a footnote. See Cover, supra
note 168, at 23 n.66.
170. See TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Metzia 59b.
171. See id. (analyzing Exodus 23:2).
172. Id; see also Deuteronomy 30:12. Fiss has used similar imagery, stating that "to
search for the brooding omnipresence in the sky [ ] is to create a false issue." Fiss, supra
note 166, at 746 (citation omitted). Fiss attributes this imagery to Justice Holmes, who
wrote that "[tihe common law is, not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articu-
late voice of some sovereign." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), quoted in Fiss, supra note 166, at 746 n.15.
173. RAN, DERASHOT 112 (Leon A. Feldman ed., 1973).
174. See id. (citing TALMUD BAvu, Bava Metzia, 59b).
175. Id. The process of arriving at an authoritative conclusion in Jewish law thus de-
pends on what is called in contemporary American legal scholarship an "interpretive com-
munity." See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT iN THIS CLASS? (1980); Fiss, supra note
166. To a certain degree, then, Fiss's observations that "[fiudicial interpretations are bind-
ing, whether or not they are correct," id. at 755, and that "[a]n interpretation is binding
even if [it is] mistaken," id at 758, are applicable to Jewish law. Yet, it appears more
accurate to say that in Jewish law, there may exist more than one correct "truth." See
generally Michael Rosensweig, Eilu ve-Eilu Divrei Elokim Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism
and Theories of Controversy, in RABBINIc AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY 93
(Moshe Sokol ed., 1992).
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ing can result in more than one logically viable solution. 76 This
principle is illustrated by another Talmudic passage, which recognizes
the possibility of a rejected yet viable opinion. The Talmud records a
number of disputes between two schools, the School of Hillel and the
School of Shamai. The Talmud follows the opinions of the School of
Hillel, which represented the majority view, yet the Talmud states that
"these and these are both the words of the Living [G-d]."' 7 7 Thus,
according to the Talmud, when there is a dispute in Jewish legal inter-
pretation between two logical points of view, both opinions may be
authentic reflections of the Divine will.178
Fiss made his observations in the context of depicting legal reasoning as a system of
"bounded objectivity" rather than of "nihilism." Fiss, supra note 166, at 745-46. In a simi-
lar vein, Rabbi Rosensweig has written that
[P]luralism is not a blank check. There are objective limitations to a sincere inter-
pretation of sources.... [M]ost... debates [in Jewish law] revolve around details
and the application of principles, not the principles themselves .... R. Moshe
Feinstein in the introduction to his [Responsa] cautions about the need for yirat
shamayim (fear of [G-d], i.e., piety) and intellectual rigor to insure valid
conclusions.
Rosensweig, supra, at 120.
Rabbi Feinstein's emphasis on piety reflects a common theme in discussions of deci-
sion-making in Jewish law, dating back to the Talmud. Rabbi Feinstein recognized the
importance of proper interpretation, due to the fact that the interpretation is religiously
binding on others, as an articulation of Divine will. Although American law does not con-
tain this aspect of Divinity, interpretation of American law is similarly binding. Thus, Fiss
has suggested that "the authoritative quality of legal interpretation ... creates a strong
critical environment; it provides unusually strong incentives to criticize and defend the
correctness of the interpretation. Something practical and important turns on judicial in-
terpretations. They are binding." Fiss, supra note 166, at 757.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
177. TALMUD BAVLI, Eruvin 13b. This concept is somewhat similar to Cover's view,
regarding Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), that "within the do-
main of constitutional meaning, the understanding of the Mennonites assumes a status
equal (or superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the Justices of the Supreme
Court." Cover, supra note 168, at 28.
178. Cover similarly wrote of "a multiplicity of coherent systems" and of "interpretive
efforts or traditions, each of which is independently defensible, or even 'right."' Cover,
supra note 168, at 17 n.45.
In Jewish law, there is an important difference in practice between a view that is viable
and "true" but rejected, and one that is inherently "false." Although the interpretation of
the Sanhedrin is binding on all judges, as a result of persecution and exile there was not
always a functioning Sanhedrin in Talmudic times. When there is no Sanhedrin, the major-
ity interpretation is followed by most of the Nation, but those who are qualified to offer
their own opinion on the matter may follow that opinion. Thus, the Talmud states that
despite the majority's rejection of their views, in matters that were not determined by a
Sanhedrin, both the School of Shamai and Rabbi Eliezer-as well as those who fell under
their jurisdiction-followed their, own views. See Elchanan Wasserman, Kuntrus Divre
Soferim, in KOBETZ SHIURIM 112 (Eliezer Wassermann ed., 4th ed. 1989).
In this sense, it may be said, using Cover's terms, that Jewish law "acknowledge[s] the
nomic integrity of each of the communities that have generated principles and
Similarly, the opinion of the Sages who disagreed with Rabbi
Eliezer was an authentic expression of Divine will and a viable view,
which was followed because it was held by the majority. The fact that
Rabbi Eliezer's opinion was "closer to the truth" does not invalidate
the Sages' opinion. In deciding an unclear law, human interpreters
may strive to attain the view closest to the truth, but may not rely on
Heavenly assistance. Instead, they must follow the dictates of human
logic. 179 If more than one view appears logical, it is because they are
both potentially viable solutions; to attain a unified legal system, inter-
preters follow the Torah's instruction to accept the majority view.'8 '
D. Precedent
A final issue related to Jewish legal interpretation involves the
question of precedent in Jewish law. In those areas of law which actu-
precepts.... [Ejach 'community of interpretation' that has achieved 'law' has its own
nomos." Cover, supra note 168, at 42.
Additionally, even when an opinion is rejected by a Sanhedrin, it still may have future
value if it is a viable interpretation. As noted above, a later Sanhedrin has the authority to
disagree with the interpretation of an earlier Sanhedrin. See supra note 26. Thus, a later
Sanhedrin may endorse as correct an interpretation that had previously been rejected.
Cf Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A
Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEx. L. REv. 405, 410 (1982) ("[T]he practice of inter-
pretation doesn't depend on interpreters' possessing godlike powers to arrive at an 'ulti-
mately provable right answer' that closes the books on further argument about the
meaning of a text. Therefore the lack of such godlike power doesn't entail
indeterminacy .... ").
179. Elaborating on Ran's analysis above, the eighteenth century scholar Rabbi Aryeh
Leb Heller wrote that the Torah is properly interpreted according to human logic and that
an interpretation is considered "true" if determined to be so through human reasoning.
ARYEH LEB HELLER, INTRODUCTION TO KETZOT HACHosHEN.
180. In fact, some Medieval legal authorities such as Ritva have explained that as part
of the Revelation to Moses, G-d provided for the existence of different yet viable interpre-
tations. See RrrvA, COMMENTARY TO THE TALMUD, Eruvin 13b. As noted above, to-
gether with the Written Law, certain details of laws were revealed orally to Moses at Sinai,
while other laws were left open to interpretation. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text. Ritva suggested that Moses was told that many of these laws have more than one
viable interpretation, and that each generation must interpret these laws for itself, accord-
ing to its own reasoning. See RrrvA, supra, at Eruvin 13b; see also TALMUD YERUSHALMI,
Sanhedrin 4:2.
Alternatively, it is possible to understand the Talmudic narrative as suggesting that, on
a level of Divine logic, Rabbi Eliezer's opinion was indeed "true" and the opinion of the
Sages was "false." This appears to be the view of Ran and Rabbi Feinstein, who write that,
at times, a binding decision may be in conflict with a transcendental "truth." Nevertheless,
human logic is followed, as it produces a "practical truth," regardless of any theoretical or
Divine "truth." The analysis in note 178, supra, applies in this conceptual framework as
well, as there may be more than one correct practical "truth," even though there is a single
transcendental "truth."
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ally involve revelation rather than interpretation,' 8 ' the "interpreta-
tion" of the Torah has immutable Divine authority. In actual
interpretation of the law, however, just as the search for truth ideally
does not respect a specific interpreter as inherently authoritative,
there should be no reliance on precedent in trying to arrive at the
truth. Moreover, there would not seem to be a practical need to ac-
cept precedent, even to the extent that society must accept one partic-
ular interpretive view out of many viable opinions. Indeed,
Maimonides allows-and requires-each generation to interpret the
law through its own reasoning. 82
Authorities in Jewish law, however, observed that in the Talmud,
legal authorities who lived after the compilation of the Mishna did not
dispute the rulings of those who lived before them. 83 According to
the principle articulated by Maimonides, the later authorities should
have had discretion to offer their own views on matters of legal inter-
pretation. Apparently, although not strictly bound by precedent, the
later authorities nevertheless accepted as binding upon themselves the
decisions of the earlier authorities. Similarly, when the Talmud was
compiled, later authorities accepted as binding the legal decisions
found in it. 84 In practice, then, the laws of the Mishna and the Tal-
mud gained the immutable authority that had previously applied only
to the revealed law.
There are a number of possible motivations for this acceptance by
the later authorities. They may have acknowledged that the preceding
generations were more likely to accurately interpret the Torah. Such
an acknowledgement may have been based in a simple recognition
that practically, those closer in time to the Revelation at Sinai are
likely to have a better understanding of the meaning of the law. A
more mystical or religious-based version of this argument is that since
the Revelation, there has been a gradual diminishing of the spiritual
nature of humanity; as earlier generations are spiritually superior, so
is their interpretation of religious law.
Alternatively, just as the need arises for Restatements in Ameri-
can law to codify the common law, there may have been a feeling that,
181. See supra text accompanying notes 27-58.
182. See Zerah Warhaftig, Precedent in Jewish Law, 6-7 SHENATON HA-MsHPAT HA-
Ivmi 105 (1979-80).
183. See JOSEPH KARO, KEsEF MISHNA, on Maimonides, Laws of Mamrim 2:1.
184. See id.; Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Two Types of Tradition, in SHEURIM L'ZEKHER
ABBA MORI 124, 136-37 (1983). Some have suggested additional points in history at which
it appears that legal authorities accepted as strongly persuasive precedent the opinions of
those who preceded them. See KAPLAN, supra note 17, at 237-41.
at certain times, the developing law should be codified uniformly.
While a Restatement may not have the same immutable authority as
the Mishna or the Talmud, it is significant that each of these codifica-
tions of Jewish law reflected hundreds of years of legal development.
Perhaps at some point in the future of American legal history, there
will be a similar call for a binding codification of much of the inter-
preted law.
The Jewish legal system has evolved over thousands of years, de-
veloping in a variety of settings ranging from the Land of Israel in the
period of the Temple to contemporary America. Many laws were
clearly defined at the Revelation at Sinai or required a limited amount
of interpretation but are now largely unchanging. Other laws depend
to varying degrees on the customs of society, and thus are continu-
ously reinterpreted, as fundamental principles are applied to changing
situations. Finally, even those laws which appear to be well-defined
often require interpretation in order to be applied to unanticipated
scenarios involving new technology or the unavailability of materials
essential for ordinary fulfillment of the law.
There is currently no Sanhedrin to decide questions in Jewish law.
Nor is it always clear which is the majority view. As a result, contem-
porary authorities in Jewish law possess a wide range of autonomy.'- 5
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who is generally regarded as the preeminent
authority on Jewish law in the latter half of the twentieth century,
stated unequivocally that a legal decisor is not only permitted but re-
quired to interpret the law independently." 6 Citing the Talmud, he
noted that "a judge must rely on his own judgment" and is prohibited
from accepting a ruling which he considers to be incorrect. 187
With this increased autonomy comes increased responsibility.
When a new question arises, contemporary authorities cannot rely on
a high court to decide the issue. Moreover, emerging technology in-
creasingly presents legal authorities with issues for which there is no
clear precedent. The role of the interpreter of Jewish law is to apply
the laws and methods that have come before to new issues in an at-
tempt to conform as closely as possible to the will of G-d.
185. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Mamrim 1:4-5.
186. See MosHE FEINSTErN, IrROTH MosHE, III Yore Deah 88 (citing TALMUD BAVLI,
Bava Bathra 130b).
187. Ic
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II. Rules and Standards in Jewish Law and American
Constitutional Law
One issue of constitutional debate that can be traced through
American legal history relates to how much flexibility should be em-
ployed in interpreting the Constitution. A similar debate is found in
Jewish legal history. While some contemporary American legal schol-
ars have engaged in textual analysis in comparing- approaches to flexi-
bility in interpretation in the two legal systems, a more useful
comparison would focus, instead, on conceptual principles of
interpretation.
The debate in American legal thought regarding flexibility in in-
terpretation has taken various forms, as has the terminology theorists
have used to describe the debate.18 8 For the purposes of this Article,
terminology distinguishing between a jurisprudence based on rules
and a jurisprudence based on standards is particularly useful. First,
Kathleen Sullivan has employed such terminology in an illuminating
analysis of current Supreme Court jurisprudence.18 9 More signifi-
cantly, this terminology is readily adaptable to Jewish law. In fact, a
contemporary scholar of Jewish law has used similar terminology to
trace different views of the proper level of flexibility for interpreting
Jewish legal principles. 90
A. Pharisees, Sadducees, Catholics, and Protestants
A number of scholars comparing the Jewish legal system with the
American legal system have considered the similarities between Bibli-
cal interpretation in Jewish law and American constitutional interpre-
tation.191 These scholars have noted that a basic issue in both legal
systems is the question of how to interpret an authoritative text.
Some scholars have further tried to demonstrate that certain issues
arising in Biblical textual interpretation sometimes find their ana-
logues in American law.192 Despite the apparent logic of these theo-
ries, a careful look at the nature of textual interpretation in the two
188. See, e.g., MARC KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDmS 303-04 nn.1-3
(1987); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379,382 n.16 (1985); various
works cited in Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: The Jus-
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 57-58 nn.230-31 (1992).
189. See generally Sullivan, supra note 188.
190. See YITZCHAK ADLER, LoMDus: A SUBSTRUCrURAL ANALYSIS 21-24 (1989).
191. See generally SANFORD LEvINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Cover, supra
note 168; Dow, supra note 8; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1984); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
192. See iL
systems reveals the problems that arise in drawing too close an
analogy.
Professor Sanford Levinson has been a leading proponent of
comparing Biblical textual interpretation with constitutional textual
interpretation. In his convincing depiction of the Constitution as a
"sacred object" in "American Civil Religion," Levinson compares
competing views of constitutional interpretation with different strains
of Biblical interpretation. 93 He develops the thesis that the different
approaches to constitutional interpretation parallel the different ap-
proaches in Christianity to interpretation of Scriptures. 94 Levinson
posits that those who favor an interpretation more faithful to the text
of the Constitution are similar to the Protestant reformers, who em-
phasized the centrality of Scriptural text alone as the basis of their
religious behavior and belief. 95 Conversely, constitutional interpret-
ers favoring a more flexible understanding of the text reflect an atti-
tude closer to that of Catholics, who read the Scriptures with an
emphasis on the oral tradition taught by the Church. 96
Levinson traces back to 1798 the dichotomy between "protes-
tant" and "catholic" constitutional interpretation.197 In Calder v.
Bull,198 Justice Chase stated that the Court could find a particular act
of Congress unconstitutional even though there was no express re-
straint on such an act in the text of the Constitution (a "catholic" re-
sult). 99 Justice Iredeli, however, stated that the Court could not place
such a limitation on legislative power absent textual constitutional
support (a "protestant" result).2"
Levinson finds the dichotomy in modem jurisprudential attitudes
as well.20' He contrasts Justice Black's "protestant" approach in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,202 with Justice Harlan's "catholicism" in Poe v
Ullman.20 3 Black argued that Connecticut's prohibition on contracep-
tives for married couples did not violate the Constitution because
there was no provision in the Constitution granting a right to privacy
193. LEviNsON, supra note 191, at 18-53.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See iL
197. Id. at 35-36.
198. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
199. See id. at 387-89.
200. See idL at 399 (Iredell, J. concurring).
201. See LEVINSON, supra note 191, at 31-35.
202. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
203. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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that would invalidate the legislation.2°4 Harlan's view of tradition al-
lowed for a reading of the Constitution that recognized rights beyond
those expressly stated in the text.205
In an effort to support Levinson's thesis, Professor Thomas Grey
has ascribed to religions other than Christianity the phenomenon of
"catholic" and "protestant" attitudes toward an authoritative text.20 6
For example, according to Grey, orthodox Sunni Islam believes that
the Koran should be supplemented by oral tradition. 20 7 Certain Is-
lamic modernizers, however, are skeptical of the authenticity of the
oral tradition and stress the authority of the writings.20 8
Grey also applies Levinson's theory to Judaism and Jewish law,
arguing that the views of the Sadducees and Pharisees paralleled those
of the Protestants and Catholics, respectively.20 9 In Grey's description
of the ancient debate, the Pharisees transmitted an oral tradition to
supplement the Written Torah, while the Sadducees considered only
the written law as binding.210 Levinson, in turn, cites Grey approv-
ingly, and notes a revival of this debate in Judaism, when the ninth
century Karaite community rebelled against Rabbinic Judaism's reli-
ance on the Oral Torah.211 Levinson concludes that the differences
between Karaite Judaism and Rabbinic Judaism, like those between
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, can serve as a basis of compar-
ison for his analysis of "protestant" and "catholic" interpretations of
the Constitution. 2
Levinson and Grey have thus identified a broadly similar tension
within different religions, including the American "Civil Religion," re-
garding the manner in which an authoritative text may be interpreted.
Yet, a careful study of these tensions within Jewish law suggests that
parallels to constitutional textual interpretation are less than precise.
First, the very portrayal of Sadducean practice rooted in the Bib-
lical text and Pharisaic practice relying more heavily on tradition ap-
pears inaccurate. In his work on the controversy between the
Pharisees and the Sadducees, Professor Louis Finkelstein analyzed
204. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508.
205. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 496.
206. Grey, supra note 191, at 6-7. Grey commented on Sanford Levinson, The Consti-
tution in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. Cr. REv. 123, which Levinson later developed
as part of Constitutional Faith.
207. See Grey, supra note 192, at 7.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 6-7.
210. See ild. at 7.
211. See LEviNsoN, supra note 191, at 25.
212. See id.
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some of the recorded debates between the two sects.213 Finkelstein
concluded that, in fact, of the two competing interpretations, that of
the Pharisees was more often closer to the literal Biblical text.214 For
example, in considering one of the points of dispute, relating to the
Temple service on Yom Kippur, Finkelstein noted that the Pharisees'
interpretation was consistent with the plain meaning of the Biblical
verses.2 15 The Sadducees, however, "violated the written word" and
"were guided in their interpretation of the law solely by the actual
custom. '216 In this area, then, the Sadducees resemble constitutional
"catholics" rather than constitutional "protestants. 2 1 7
More fundamentally, the very nature of these controversies
within Jewish legal history would not seem likely to provide a helpful
model for the dichotomy in American legal tradition described by
Levinson and Grey. As Finkelstein wrote of the Pharisees and Sad-
ducees, "[n]either sect determined its views by such artificial and
spurious principles as 'literal' and 'liberal' interpretation of Scrip-
ture. 2 1 8 Moreover, unlike the ongoing debate that Levinson shows
exists in American constitutional interpretation,2 1 9 any dispute in Jew-
ish history regarding the supremacy of oral interpretation proved to
be short-lived. There remains no substantial segment of the Jewish
people that follows the text over the oral tradition. Thus, Finkelstein's
conclusions, together with the realities of Jewish legal history, belie an
analogy to literal and expansive constitutional textual interpretation.
B. Rules and Standards-A Basic Framework
A more accurate description of the tension in Jewish law relating
to discretion in legal interpretation might focus on the broader issue
of interpretation of legal principles, rather than the issue of the liter-
ary and exegetical interpretation of the Bible as an authoritative text.
Such an alternative analysis might also allow for a more useful com-
parison to American legal theory. Indeed, Kathleen Sullivan's formu-
lation of the question of judicial discretion in interpreting the
Constitution is an apt description of questions of flexibility of inter-
213. See Louis FNKLESTEIN, THE PHARISEES 101 (1962).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 119, 654-57.
216. Il at 120.
217. Similarly, in a dispute relating to the calendar, which Finkelstein called "the most
bitter and the most prominent" of the controversies, the Sadducees again rejected the lit-
eral interpretation of the Biblical text. Id. at 647-48.
218. 1& at 101.
219. See LEviNSON, supra note 191, at 36.
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pretation in Jewish law as well. Sullivan wrote that "[b]ecause virtu-
ally nobody really believes the no-judicial-legislation argument in its
strongest and most naive form, the real question is not whether the
Court should exercise discretion in constitutional interpretation, but
rather how much."220 Similarly, virtually no authorities in Jewish law
have really believed the argument, in its most naive form, that the
Biblical text should not be interpreted. After all, the Bible is full of
laws that are impossible to practice without meaningful interpretation
of Biblical passages. For example, as noted above,221 the Bible pro-
hibits the performance of melakha on the Sabbath. The term "me-
lakha," usually translated in English as "work," is just as ambiguous in
the ancient Hebrew form of the word as in the English translation.
Other than an express prohibition against lighting a fire on the Sab-
bath, the Bible offers no details of what work is forbidden. The only
means of deriving a definition of the term melakha is therefore
through an oral tradition or based on exegetical principles of
interpretation.
Because it is clear that the Bible cannot be understood and ap-
plied without interpretation, a basic question of interpretation in Jew-
ish law, as in constitutional law, revolves around how much discretion
is available to interpretive authorities. Although constitutional dis-
putes sometimes involve the interpretation of a particular word in the
text of the Constitution, Sullivan has observed that "the constitutional
interpretation debate converges with pervasive jurisprudential de-
bates over the relative merits of the choice of legal form, because in
these debates the amount of judicial discretion has been thought to
depend on the form in which legal directives are addressed to
judges."222 Similarly, in Jewish law, disputes in legal interpretation oc-
casionally focus on the interpretation of the Biblical text. Yet, regard-
less of how closely the questions relate to Biblical interpretation, the
underlying and conceptual basis of the disputes often depends on
more fundamental questions of how to understand the form and inter-
pretation of legal directives.
Sullivan shows how splits between Justices in the 1991 Supreme
Court Term relating to constitutional interpretation can be analyzed in
the context of "rules and standards." 3 In addition to being an effec-
220. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 56-57.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
222. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 56-57.
223. Id. at 57.
tive way to understand contemporary American legal theory,'3 the
distinction between rules and standards is particularly helpful in dis-
cussing questions in Jewish law related to flexibility in interpreting
legal principles. A discussion of Jewish law in such a context may, in
turn, help illuminate certain issues in American legal thought.
In discussing the different methods of interpreting legal direc-
tives, Sullivan delineates two categories of judges: those who consider
laws to be "rules," and those who interpret laws as "standards."' ' 5
Basic to Sullivan's framework is the notion that "[r]ules, once formu-
lated, afford decisionmakers less discretion than do standards. ' '12 6
Before discussing the relative merits of interpreting legal directives
either as rules or as standards, Sullivan first sets down functional defi-
nitions for the different categories.1 7 When a legal directive operates
as a rule, according to Sullivan, it minimizes the decision-maker's dis-
cretion by requiring a specific decision when certain facts are present
in a case."2 Although a rule is an expression of a background princi-
ple or policy, once formulated, the rule operates independently.229
Thus, the rule, as formulated, is applied to the operative facts, even
when such an application, under the circumstances, would contradict
the principle or policy underlying the rule.230 A standard, on the
other hand, relates the decision directly to the background principle
or policy underlying the legal directive231 Thus, when treating a legal
directive as a standard, a decision-maker has more discretion,
"tak[ing] into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances. ' '1 32
A contemporary scholar of Jewish law, Rabbi Yitzchak Adler, has
articulated a similar dichotomy to categorize different ways of inter-
preting legal directives in the Jewish legal system.233 One view, paral-
224. See iU
225. See id.
226. L
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. 1&.
233. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 21-24. I am mindful of Stone's observation that
"[t]he Jewish legal tradition is being subtly reinterpreted to yield a legal counter-model
embodying precisely the qualities many contemporary theorists wish to inject into Ameri-
can law," Stone, supra note 1, at 814, and I have been careful to avoid falling into the path
she has described. While my use of the terminology of rules and standards is based on the
works of contemporary American legal theorists, my use of the principles reflected in this
terminology to describe Jewish law is based on the works of Adler, a contemporary Jewish
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lel to Sullivan's description of "rules," is that legal directives must be
applied as formulated. This position holds that, although certain con-
ceptual constructs may have formed the foundation for the legal direc-
tive, there is no license to reinterpret the directive in light of its
conceptual basis.3
The competing view, which parallels Sullivan's description of
"standards," is that the conceptual ideas which form the basis of legal
directives are a part of the law, to be applied together with the stated
directives. Under this view, while it is true that legal directives are
usually expressed in definite form, this is largely for the sake of con-
venience and simplicity. In applying the directive, it is necessary to
interpret it not in terms of its simplistic formulation, but through un-
derstanding the more complex policies behind the law. 35
The rules/standards dichotomy is important in the analysis of con-
stitutional law not only because it helps us understand some of the
major issues in contemporary American jurisprudence, but also be-
cause it is useful in tracing some of the continuing conflicts in constitu-
tional interpretation, such as those that Levinson discusses. In fact,
Pierre Schlag has equated constitutional "textualists" with those who
favor viewing legal directives as rules.236 Conversely, Schlag argues, a
decision-maker who interprets the Constitution with more flexibility,
and who is sensitive to considerations other than the text of the Con-
stitution, sees a legal directive as a standard, to be applied in light of
the values represented by the directive.3 If Schlag's equations are
accurate, they suggest a further advantage to analyzing Jewish legal
interpretive principles in terms of rules and standards.
Through the rules/standards dichotomy, Jewish law can serve as
an analogue to both Sullivan's analysis of American law, as well as,
broadly, to Levinson's catholic/protestant dichotomy. At the same
time, this formulation of Jewish law is preferable to Levinson's discus-
scholar, who analyzes the Jewish legal system on its own terms. Therefore, although I
express the hope that interpretation in the Jewish legal tradition can shed light on views of
interpreting the Constitution, my discussion of the Jewish tradition is based on Jewish legal
scholarship rather than on a reinterpretation of the Jewish tradition to match any desired
view of American legal theory.
234. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 21-22.
235. See id. at 22. Interpreting directives as standards involves applying legal principles
conceptually, which differs from restricting the application of mitzvot based on their ration-
ale. See supra text accompanying notes 94-115.
236. Schlag, supra note 188, at 390-91.
237. See id at 392-93.
sion of Pharisees and Sadducees because it is more consistent with the
historical realities of Jewish Biblical interpretative debate.238
C. Rules and Standards in American Constitutional Law
While Levinson referred to Justice Black's "protestant" approach
to the Constitution,239 Black can likewise be pictured as a justice who
favors absolute rules. Black's words in Rochin v. California24 ° reflect
the rule-based approach: "[F]aithful adherence to the specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of indi-
vidual liberty than that which can be afforded by the nebulous
standards stated by the majority."24' In writing the majority opinion
and formulating what Black called "nebulous standards," Frankfurter
stated: "In dealing... with human rights, the absence of formal exact-
itude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regretta-
ble attribute of constitutional provisions."242 Thus, Frankfurter's view
provided a standard-based contrast to Black, parallel to the "catholic"
contrast provided by Harlan in Levinson's framework.243
Furthermore, Levinson's own analysis of the views of Black and
Harlan, in Griswold and Poe respectively,2' is consistent with an ex-
planation of the differing views in terms of rules and standards. Elab-
orating on his dissenting opinion in Griswold, Black later wrote that
he could not grant protection to married couples to use contracep-
tives, absent a "specific provision," granting such a right.24 5 Black ar-
gued in Griswold that if the law granting certain rights does not
address a specific set of facts, the rule should not be interpreted to
238. See supra text accompanying notes 214-219.
239. The rules/standards dichotomy can be traced back as far as Levinson's catholic/
protestant dichotomy, to Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See supra text accom-
panying notes 197-200. Justice Chase, whom Levinson described as a "catholic" interpreter
of the Constitution, employed a standard-based view, looking to the reasons that moti-
vated the constitutional clause under consideration. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 388-89. Justice
Iredell, a "protestant" in Levinson's framework, responded with a rule-based approach,
looking for "fixed standards" and delineating "but two lights, in which the subject can be
viewed: If the Legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. If
they trangres [sic] the boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid." Id. at 399 (Ire-
dell, J., concurring).
240. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
241. Id. at 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); see also Sullivan, supra note 188, at 26 n.19
(classifying Black and Frankfurter's views in Rochin as consistent with their favoring rules
and standards, respectively).
242. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
243. Levinson similarly writes of Frankfurter's nontextualist view, which recognized the
"unwritten Constitution." See LEvINSON, supra note 191, at 33-34.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 202-205.
245. HuGo BLAcK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9 (1968).
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apply to those facts.246 In Poe, Harlan rejected such rules-based juris-
prudence, declaring that "[d]ue process has not been reduced to any
formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any
code." 247 Instead of relying on a rule or formula, Harlan based his
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment on "the balance... built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual... between
the liberty and the demands of organized society.' ' 248 Thus, he under-
stood and applied the Due Process Clause in light of the principles of
respect for individual liberties upon which it was based? 49
The debate between those who favor a jurisprudence of rules and
those who view legal directives as standards has continued. For exam-
ple, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,250 the Court
held that granting veto power to one house of Congress was a viola-
tion of the presentment and bicameralism clauses. 25' Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion focused on the constitutional text, holding
that the clauses of the Constitution were precise rules, not to be con-
sidered "empty formalities."' 25 2 Justice White dissented, criticizing
Burger's approach as grouping together all legislative vetoes, rather
than properly considering the standards represented by the constitu-
tional clauses and applying them to the different circumstances, which
vary with the "form or subject" of each veto. 53
Sullivan has shown that the rules/standards dichotomy can be
used to explain many of the debates between Justices on the current
Supreme Court.254 In Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,25 for example, Justice
Scalia, a strict "protestant" in the interpretation of the constitutional
text, used a rule-based view to formulate the legal principle at issue in
246. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also BLACK,
supra note 245, at 9.
247. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
248. Id
249. Schlag offers a similar description of the differing views of Holmes and Cardozo
regarding the obligation of a driver who approaches an unguarded railroad crossing. See
Schlag, supra note 188, at 379. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S.
66, 70 (1927), Holmes posited a rule that the driver must stop and look, while in Pokora v.
Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98,104-06 (1934), Cardozo relied on a standard, holding that
the driver must act with reasonable caution.
250. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
251. See id; see also Schlag, supra note 188, at 393 (identifying the rules/standards di-
chotomy in Chadha).
252. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n.23.
253. Id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
254. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 77-79.
255. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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the case.56 Scalia stated the issue as whether the Due Process Clause
had been interpreted as "relating to the rights of an adulterous natural
father. ''1 57 Justice Brennan's dissent offered a broader standard,
which described "parenthood" as the "interest" being protected. 8 In
their concurring opinion, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also re-
jected Scalia's strict adherence to a rules-based mode of legal inter-
pretation, quoting Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe and echoing
White's criticism of Burger's opinion in Chadha.25 9 They argued that
Scalia's approach did not pay sufficient attention to particular circum-
stances, but instead "foreclose[d] the unanticipated by the prior impo-
sition of a single mode of... analysis. 260
Sullivan's discussion of the rules/standards dichotomy in the 1991
Supreme Court Term is perhaps most significant in her analysis of the
different views expressed in the complex and controversial case of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.261 In their plurality opinion joined by
Justice Souter, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy again quoted Harlan
in Poe, and echoed both Justice White's thoughts in Chadha as well as
their own opinion in Michael H.262 They wrote that liberty is inter-
preted by judges through "reasoned judgment" and is "not susceptible
of expression as a simple rule. '263 Scalia again attacked this balanc-
ing, standard-based approach, calling it "nothing but philosophical
predilection and moral intuition. ' '2 4
Sullivan aptly summarizes the standard-based plurality opinion:
"Casey simply abandoned a rule that all regulatory burdens on adult
abortions are coercive no matter how great or how small in favor of a
standard that takes into account the quantity of impact on pregnant
256. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175,
1184 (1989) ("[lIt is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges to develop general
rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of a text."); see
also George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297,
1299 (1990); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 991, 993 (1994) ("[Scalia's] well-known preferences for textualism,
originalism, and traditionalism derive in large part from, but are also secondary to, his
passion for strict legal rules that he believes will provide greater certainty and uniformity
to the law.").
257. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
258. Id- at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260. Id.
261. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
262. See id. at 843-901 (plurality opinion).
263. Id. at 849.
264. Id. at 1000 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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women."265 In contrast, Sullivan notes, Scalia relied on a rule-based
view, arguing in part that the Court would strike down "'a state law
requiring purchasers of religious books to endure a 24-hour waiting
period, or to pay a nominal additional tax of 1 [cent]."' 266 Scalia thus
ignored the plurality's quantitative analysis of the actual effect of the
law, rejecting its careful consideration of the impact of a law in favor
of a rule.267
In many opinions issued since the publication of Sullivan's article,
the Justices have continued to split along the lines of rules and stan-
dards. For example, in interpreting the Establishment Clause in
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,26s
Justice O'Connor continued to emphasize the need for balancing the
effects of laws, writing that "[e]xperience proves that the Establish-
ment Clause ... cannot easily be reduced to a single test.1269 She
repeated this statement in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,270 rejecting "categorical answers" to Establish-
ment Clause questions. 271
The dissenting opinion in Rosenberger adopted the rigid logic of a
rule-based attitude. The dissent cited the view that "[a]lthough Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the
Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed... indoctrina-
tion into the beliefs of a particular religious faith. '2 7 2 Having stated a
precise rule, the dissent asked a question that epitomizes the rule-
based approach: "Why does this Court not apply this clear law to
these clear facts . . . ?273
D. Rules and Standards in Jewish Law
The corpus of Jewish law comprises a complex legal system, en-
compassing both civil (or monetary) and religious (or ritual) legal
principles. For a number of reasons, it is not always easy or even pro-
ductive to attempt to classify specific laws as "civil" or "religious"
265. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 34.
266. ld. at 34 n.69 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)).
267. See id.
268. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1993).
269. Id. at 2499 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
270. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
271. Id. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 2539 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
273. Id.
laws. First, on a theological level, the entire Jewish legal system is
considered to be religious in nature. Even those laws which involve
civil principles are reflections of Divine will regarding the manner in
which society should function. Second, analytically, many laws gov-
erning civil matters also involve religious duties and obligations, com-
plicating any classification of these laws into a single category.2 74
Third, all laws, including those which involve purely civil or religious
matters, share a common methodological framework. Legal princi-
ples such as conditions and agency, for example, are as relevant to
religious acts and obligations as they are to civil issues of property or
contract law.
The very factors that sometimes make it difficult to categorize the
Jewish legal system into separate civil and religious areas may, how-
ever, also facilitate a structural and conceptual analysis of Jewish law.
Because civil and religious law share much common ground, it is pos-
sible to apply many of the same legal principles, in a similar manner,
to both settings. For example, to address a question regarding the ap-
plication of conditions to contract law, Jewish law may look to the way
conditions are used in relation to a certain religious obligation. Thus,
the Jewish legal system can be viewed, through a variety of analytical
methods, as a unified system, with principles that can be applied uni-
formly to understand and classify different laws.
One method that can be used to analyze the Jewish legal system
parallels Sullivan's method of analyzing constitutional law, which di-
vides interpretation of legal directives into rule-based interpretation
and standard-based interpretation. A number of legal directives in
Jewish law have been open to different interpretations by legal au-
thorities. The different interpretations can often be understood in
terms of whether the interpreting authority viewed a particular direc-
tive as a "rule," which is to be applied as formulated without further
consideration of the conceptual framework that motivated the law, or
as a "standard," a simplistic formulation of more complex principles
that govern the application of the law.
Rabbi Adler has explored the dichotomy between rule-based
legal interpretation and standard-based interpretation by classifying
legal directives into three categories: (1) general laws; (2) laws of
274. In Rabbi Adler's terminology, this phenomenon presents a category of "dual clas-
sification." ADLER, supra note 190, at 18-20; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-
43.
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equivalence; and (3) laws of quantification.275 An example of each of
these types of law and of the conceptual analysis applicable to each
should help illustrate some of the parallels and differences between
Jewish legal interpretation and American legal interpretation.
1. General Laws276
The Talmud states the following law: When agency may not be
employed for a given activity, conditions may not be placed on the
performance of that activity.277 The application of this law to the case
of the nazarite 278 illustrates the two ways of viewing a legal directive.
Although a nazarite may not appoint an agent to observe the prohibi-
tions required by the nazarite oath, it is clear from the Talmud that a
person may place certain conditions on the oath.279 Thus, at first
glance, the laws relating to the nazarite seem to contradict the princi-
ple that when an agent cannot be appointed, conditions may not be
applied. In resolving the apparent contradiction, Medieval authorities
took one of two basic approaches, evidently relying on either rule-
based interpretation or standard-based interpretation.
Some authorities viewed the Talmudic principle as a rule, to be
applied precisely as statedV80 These authorities accepted the law as
formulated, holding that in any case in which a person may not ap-
point an agent to perform a particular activity, the person may not
place conditions on the performance of the activity. 1 According to
this reasoning, if a person may not appoint an agent for the perform-
ance of the nazarite obligations, that person should be precluded from
placing conditions on the performance of those obligations. These au-
275. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 21-30. The application of Sullivan's terms of rules
and standards to Jewish law is my own; Rabbi Adler does not use these terms. In fact,
Rabbi Adler refers to what I call "legal directives" or "laws" as "rules." He then deline-
ates the two possible ways of interpreting these "rules": applying them either precisely as
stated or through uncovering the conceptual bases for the rules.
To avoid the obvious confusion that would result in using Sullivan's terminology to-
gether with that of Rabbi Adler, I have chosen to use uniform terminology for both legal
systems. I have chosen to use Sullivan's terminology because of its common use in contem-
porary American legal scholarship. As noted above, and as the present analysis should
make clear, Sullivan's terminology is adaptable to the Jewish legal system and consistent
with the scholarship described by Rabbi Adler.
276. Rabbi Adler discusses general laws in the English section of his book, supra note
190, at 22-24, and more extensively in the Hebrew section, id- at 77-85.
277. See TALMUD BAVLI, Kethuboth 74a.
278. The Bible states that a man or woman who takes the nazarite oath may not drink
wine, come in contact with dead bodies, or take a shave or haircut. See Numbers 6:3-6.
279. See TALMUD BAVLI, Nazir 11a, the Tosafoth commentary.
280. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 22-24 (English section), 77-78 (Hebrew section).
281. See id.
thorities noted, however, that although agency is inapplicable to the
observance of the prohibitions incumbent on a nazarite, a nazarite
may appoint an agent to bring the sacrifice required at the end of the
nazarite period.' 2 Due to this limited power of agency, the nazarite's
ability to place certain conditions on the observance of the other naza-
rite obligations does not violate the Talmudic principle.
Others suggested a different approach, based on a consideration
of the conceptual basis of the law that precludes conditions when
agency does not apply.283 These authorities viewed the Talmudic prin-
ciple as a general expression of the relationship between agency and
conditions in Jewish law.2 4 The common ground of these two legal
functions is that the authority either to appoint an agent to perform an
activity or to place conditions on the performance of an activity indi-
cates a certain level of control in regard to that activity. The Talmudic
principle is then understood as teaching, generally, that if a person
does not have the authority to appoint an agent to perform a given
activity, then the person likewise does not possess the requisite level
of control over that activity to impose conditions on its performance.
According to these authorities, however, the Talmudic law should be
applied not as stating a definite rule but only as reflecting the standard
by which authority and control are generally measured and related.
2,8
By viewing the legal directive as a standard, these authorities allow for
exceptions to the law when the rationale underlying the law does not
apply. 8 6 One such case is the nazarite.
An individual has broad control over the observance of the naza-
rite laws. After all, a person has the autonomy to choose voluntarily
whether and when to take the nazarite oath. Using a standard-based
interpretation of the Talmudic principle, we can understand that such
control similarly enables a person to place conditions on the oath.
While it is true that a nazarite may not appoint an agent to observe
the prohibitions, this fact does not indicate a lack of control over the
activities. Rather, it is technically impossible to appoint an agent in
the context of the nazarite oath because the oath imposes personal
modes of behavior on the individual that simply cannot be performed
by an agent.287 Therefore, according to these authorities, the Tal-
282. See id; see also Numbers 6:14-21.
283. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 22-24 (English section), 77 (Hebrew section).
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id
287. See supra note 278. For example, if a nazarite drinks wine, the nazarite obviously
violates the prohibition on this activity, even if an "agent" refrains from drinking wine.
COMPARING JEWISH LEGAL THEORY
Winter 19971
Winter 19971
492 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:441
mudic principle should not be applied to the nazarite as stated; the
case of the nazarite represents an exception. z5 Once the Talmudic
law is viewed as an expression of the conceptual framework relating to
individual control over an activity, its application to the nazarite al-
lows for the imposition of conditions even though agency cannot
apply.
, The example of the nazarite laws offers a look at the way Jewish
legal directives can be viewed through the rules/standards dichotomy.
The laws regarding the nazarite have been debated by classical au-
thorities in Jewish law in a way that parallels Sullivan's analysis of
constitutional interpretation. In addition, the application of the laws
of agency and conditions to the nazarite helps illustrate the conceptual
consistency within the Jewish legal system. The case of the nazarite,
who takes it upon himself or herself to refrain from certain activities,
may be seen as paradigmatic of religious or ritual areas of Jewish law.
Yet, the case of the nazarite also involves the legal principles of
agency and conditions, which are an important part of Jewish civil law,
and, indeed, central to many areas of American law. The conceptual
analysis relating to agency and conditions is identical in both Jewish
religious law and Jewish civil law and, therefore, could theoretically be
adaptable to secular legal systems as well.
2. Laws of Equivalence89
The Talmud draws the following legal equivalence in the context
of monetary adjudication: an admission is equivalent to the testimony
of one hundred witnesses.290 Although Jewish law ordinarily requires
the testimony of two witnesses for the adjudication of a monetary ob-
ligation, while excluding the testimony of a party to a case, an individ-
ual's admission to an obligation is accepted as dispositive.29' The
Talmud thus recognizes a certain equivalence between an individual's
admission and the testimony of two witnesses.292 Yet, Jewish legal au-
thorities have debated the interpretation of this law.
Thus, nazarite requirements differ fundamentally from obligations which can be performed
by an agent on behalf of the principal.
288. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 22-24 (English section), 77 (Hebrew section).
289. Rabbi Adler discusses laws of equivalence in the English section of his book, id. at
24-27, and in the Hebrew section, id. at 86-93.
290. See, e.g., TALMUD BAvLi, Bava Metzia 3b.
291. See id.
292. For the purposes of a monetary obligation, two witnesses are thus as effective as
one hundred witnesses. The language of the Talmud, equating an admission to one hun-
dred witnesses, is an emphatic way of teaching that an admission is clearly sufficient.
Some authorities have interpreted the Talmud's statement of
equivalence as a rule, to be applied precisely as formulated, indicating
that an admission has an effect identical to that of the testimony of
witnesses.293 Others have understood the law as a general expression
of the fact that a confession shares certain legal properties with the
testimony of two witnesses, not as a statement of absolute equivalence
between an admission and the testimony of witnesses.294
One of the legal ramifications of the debate involves the question
of when an obligation vests if it is realized through a confession.
Legal authorities split over the two possible answers to this question.
One view is that an admission works retroactively, and therefore the
obligation vests from the time that, according to the admission, the
obligation originated.295 The other view is that the obligation vests
only from the time that the admission itself occurs.296 These two
views seem to diverge along the lines of the rules/standards
dichotomy.
If the Talmudic statement equating an admission with the testi-
mony of witnesses is interpreted as a precise rule, then the equiva-
lence is to be taken literally. The rule-based view would hold that,
although on one level there are clear differences between an admis-
sion and the testimony of witnesses, in terms of legal effect they share
identical properties. According to a rule-based reading of the Tal-
mud's formulation of the law, an admission, like two witnesses, is a
form of sufficient testimony, but also a unique situation in which a
party to a case is permitted to testify because the testimony is against
monetary self-interest. Therefore, just as an obligation realized
through the testimony of witnesses vests retroactively from the time
that, according to the testimony, the obligation arose, an admission
has the same retroactive effect.
According to a standard-based interpretation, however, this law
is a general statement of equivalence, articulating the legal similarities
between an admission and the testimony of witnesses vis-a-vis the
standard required to adjudicate a monetary obligation. The Talmud
does state that, like the testimony of witnesses, an admission is suffi-
cient to impose a monetary obligation.29 Yet, authorities applying a
standard-based approach may view this law through a conceptual in-
293. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 88-90.
294. See id
295. See BErtH SHEMUEL, EVEN HA'EZER 3831.
296. See CHELKAT MECHOKEK, EVEN HA'EZER 38:22.
297. See TALMUD BAVLi, Bava Metzia 3b.
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terpretation, allowing for flexibility in considering the precise nature
of the equivalence between an admission and witnesses. These au-
thorities would hold that the testimony of a party to a case is never
admissible, even against that party's monetary interests.298 Rather the
legal effect of an admission stems from its status as the granting of a
gift on the part of the admitting party. Obviously, the benefactor's
obligation for a gift can vest only from the time of the granting of the
gift. Therefore, these authorities hold, an obligation realized through
an admission does not vest retroactively.
3. Laws of Quantification299
Many areas of the Jewish legal system involve specific measure-
ments or quantities. For example, the Torah prohibits eating or drink-
ing on Yom Kippur and mandates a strict punishment for an
individual who violates this prohibition."° The Talmud, in turn, quan-
tifies the amount of food that must be consumed to warrant such a
harsh punishment.3 '
The Talmud also states that the prohibition against eating or
drinking on Yom Kippur is not violated through the consumption of
foods or objects that are spoiled or inedible, such as pure vinegar; in
legal terms, consumption of these objects is not considered "eating" or
"drinking," since it does not conform to the ordinary manner of eating
or drinking. 0 2 Yet the Talmudic law which states that drinking pure
vinegar does not violate the prohibition against drinking on Yom Kip-
pur is open to interpretation. The application of the law may again
depend on the rules/standards dichotomy in interpreting legal
directives.
298. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 88-90.
299. Rabbi Adler discusses laws of quantification in the English section of his book, UL
at 28-30, and in the Hebrew section, id. at 94-100.
300. See Leviticus 23:29.
301. See TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 73b. For eating, the quantity is kotheveth hagasah,
roughly between one and two ounces, while for drinking, the quantity is melo lugmav, the
amount of liquid that would fill one cheek. See MAiMONmDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note
17, at Laws of Yom Kippur 2:1. While the precise quantity of melo lugmav varies accord-
ing to the individual, it is generally around 1.5 fluid ounces. Consumption of these quanti-
ties subjects the individual to the harsh Biblical punishment. The Talmud also records a
prohibition against the consumption of any amount of food or drink on Yom Kippur,
though consumption of a smaller quantity violates a lesser prohibition, and thus does not
incur the same harsh punishment. See TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 73b. There is a dispute in the
Talmud whether the lesser prohibition is of Biblical or Rabbinic origin. The prevailing
opinion is that the prohibition is of Biblical origin. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra
note 17, at Laws of Yom Kippur 2:3.
302. See TALMUD BAVLi, Yoma 81a-81b.
The question arose among Medieval legal authorities as to
whether it is permissible to drink a quantity of pure vinegar substan-
tially larger than the ordinary quantity prohibited on Yom Kippur.0 3
Rabbenu Yerucham wrote that the exemption for eating or drinking
spoiled or inedible objects applies only when small quantities are con-
sumed.3° Drinking a large quantity of vinegar, however, violates the
prohibition against drinking.30 5 Maimonides is of the opposite opin-
ion, holding that regardless of how much vinegar is drunk, there is no
violation of the Biblical prohibition.3°
This dispute can be understood in terms of the rules/standards
dichotomy. Maimonides views the Talmudic laws for eating and
drinking on Yom Kippur as formal rules. One rule is that a person
may not drink a certain quantity on Yom Kippur.30 7 Another rule,
generally applicable in Jewish law, is that eating or drinking a spoiled
or inedible object does not qualify as eating or drinking.30 8 When
these rules are applied formally, as stated, they produce the logical
conclusion that regardless of how large a quantity of vinegar one actu-
ally drinks on Yom Kippur, there is no violation of the prohibition.
The prohibition as formulated prohibits only consumption that fits the
legal definition of eating or drinking. Therefore, the exemption as
formulated excludes the consumption of pure vinegar from the legal
category of drinking.
Rabbenu Yerucham, however, interprets the two laws as reflec-
tions of the standard of behavior that the Torah and the Talmud man-
date on Yom Kippur. The Torah states that on Yom Kippur, as part of
the process of repentance, a person must undergo a certain amount of
affliction. 30 9 The Talmud explains that fasting on Yom Kippur is the
primary way to observe this affliction.310 Rabbenu Yerucham there-
fore interprets the laws of fasting in the context of the standards of
affliction required on Yom Kippur, understanding that fasting must be
303. See JOSEPH KARO, BErr YosEF: LAWS OF YOM KIPPUR 612.
304. See Ud.
305. See id.
306. See id.; see also MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Yom Kip-
pur 2:5 (holding that a person who drinks even a large quantity of pure vinegar on Yom
Kippur does not violate the Biblical prohibition). It should be noted that Maimonides
holds that there is still a Rabbinic prohibition against drinking large quantities of vinegar.
See id.
307. See Leviticus 23:29.
308. See MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, supra note 17, at Laws of Yom Kippur 2:5.
309. See Leviticus 23:27.
310. See TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 74b.
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connected with affliction.31' Thus, he understands the Talmudic law
exempting vinegar from the prohibition on drinking to be based on
the principle that, generally, drinking vinegar or consuming other in-
edible foods will not remove the affliction resulting from fasting.312
However, if one drinks a sufficiently large quantity of vinegar, the sa-
tiety resulting from the sheer amount of liquid consumed will in fact
remove the affliction of fasting.3 1 3 Therefore, consumption of such a
quantity is prohibited on Yom Kippur.
To a certain degree, the application of the rules/standards dichot-
omy to laws of quantification in the Jewish legal system resembles the
rules/standards debate in Casey.314 As Sullivan explained, the stan-
dard-based plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey consid-
ered regulations on abortions in the context of the impact that the
regulations would have on pregnant women.31 5 Similarly, Rabbenu
Yerucham views the laws regarding fasting on Yom Kippur, including
the exemption for drinking pure vinegar, in the context of the effect
that drinking vinegar would have on the fulfillment of the Biblical im-
perative to afflict one's self on Yom Kippur.31 6
In contrast, Justice Scalia's rule-based opinion in Casey discussed
a hypothetical case in which a state law imposed minor restrictions on
the purchase of religious books and concluded that the laws would
clearly be unconstitutional, regardless of the actual nature of their ef-
fect on religious practice.31 7 Similarly, Maimonides held that the laws
of Yom Kippur, when viewed as strict rules, yield the conclusion that
drinking even a large quantity of vinegar does not violate the prohibi-
tion against drinking because it simply does not conform to the legal
definition of drinking.31 8 Interpretation of the laws as rules leaves no
room for consideration of whether drinking a large quantity of vinegar
is conceptually inconsistent with the fulfillment of the Biblical com-
mand requiring affliction on Yom Kippur.
311. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 29-30 (English section), 98 (Hebrew section).
312. See id
313. See id
314. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
315. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 34.
316. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 29-30 (English section), 98 (Hebrew section) (citing
and explaining Rabbenu Yerucham).
317. See 505 U.S. at 988 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 29-30 (English section), 98 (Hebrew section) (citing
and explaining Maimonides).
E. Reasons for Rules or Standards
Many contemporary American legal theorists who have acknowl-
edged and discussed the rules/standards debate have identified argu-
ments for and against each of the positions. Duncan Kennedy was
one of the first scholars to offer a systematic analysis of the relative
pros and cons for rules or standards.3" Schlag relied heavily on Ken-
nedy's work and dedicated much of his article to dissecting Kennedy's
propositions.2 °
This Article aims not to analyze the relative merits of the various
arguments but rather to analyze the application of these arguments to
the rules/standards dichotomy that exists within Jewish law. Sullivan's
more recent discussion of the arguments for rules or standards, which
draws from many earlier sources and presents the arguments and
counter-arguments in a clear and considered manner, provides a help-
ful framework for such an analysis.
Sullivan has identified four central categories of argument that
can be offered to support each side of the rules/standards debate.
One argument in favor of rules is that they produce "fairness as for-
mal equity," preventing arbitrary decisions by "requir[ing] deci-
sionmakers to act consistently [in] treating like cases alike."3 21
Another reason to employ rules is based on their "utility," affording
both private actors and judges certainty and predictability.322 Third,
Sullivan identifies advocates of the Rule of Law who argue that rules
promote "liberty" by setting in advance the extent of governmental
authority.323 Finally, rules are seen by some as important for "democ-
racy" because they "allocate roles or power among competing
decisionmakers." 324
Sullivan suggests that the arguments for standards can be placed
in the same four general categories, though the categories are then
viewed from the opposite perspective. 325 In contrast to "fairness as
formal equality," standards offer "fairness as substantive justice";
319. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. RFv. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976).
320. See Schlag, supra note 188, at 383-430; see also John P. Goebel, Rules and Stan-
dards: A Critique of Two Critical Theorists, 31 Duo. L. REv. 51 (1992) (concluding that
Schlag's argument fails to replace Kennedy's convincing position); KELMAN, supra note
188, at 40-63.
321. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 62.
322. See id. at 62-63.
323. See id. at 63-64.
324. Id. at 64.
325. See id. at 66.
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standards enable decision-makers to explore among cases relevant
similarities and differences which would not be discovered through
the strict application of rules.326 Similarly, standards may be better
suited for "utility," increasing productivity because they "allow deci-
sionmakers to adapt [the law] to changing circumstances."3 27 In con-
trast to the value of "liberty," some scholars argue that standards
contribute to the value of "equality" by serving "redistributive pur-
poses."3 28 Finally, in response to the claim that rules promote "de-
mocracy," it is arguable that in reality rules favor "judicial abdication
of responsibility," while standards promote "deliberation" by forcing
decision-makers to "face up to [their] choices. 3 29
A number of the arguments for rules or standards are relevant to
the Jewish legal system in a similar if not identical manner. The fact
that other arguments do not apply to Jewish law may help illustrate
some of the basic differences between the Jewish and American legal
systems, as well as some of the limitations on their comparison.
The first two categories of argument seem readily applicable to
Jewish law. As in American law, the arguments for a rule-based ap-
proach in Jewish law can include the claim that rules help produce
"fairness as formal equity," by resulting in a uniformity of decision in
cases that share broadly similar facts. Similarly, rules offer "utility"
and are economical330 because they are relatively simple to apply331
and do not require the difficult analysis sometimes necessary for the
application of standards.332
The arguments in favor of standards are likewise applicable in the
context of Jewish law. In a standard-based approach, there is an em-
phasis on the important and relevant details of each individual case.333
The result is "fairness in substantive justice," as each case is consid-
ered on its specific facts. The "utility" of standards in Jewish law is
also apparent. Standards give the decision-maker the opportunity to
engage in "flexibility and a degree of interpretive license" when the
situation so demands.334
326. Id.
327. Id
328. Id. at 67.
329. Id
330. See ADLER, supra note 190, at 21.
331. See id. at 24.
332. See id at 30.
333. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 66.
334. ADLER, supra note 190, at 30.
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Yet it is difficult and probably unproductive to try to apply to
Jewish law the other two types of argument that Sullivan identifies for
rules or standards. Concepts of both "liberty" and "equality" have
their place in the Jewish legal system, but their definition in Jewish law
would likely differ substantially from the way they are understood in
American legal and political thought.335 Arguments based on notions
of "democracy," particularly those based specifically on the American
system of government, are even less likely to apply to the Jewish legal
system.
Many of these difficulties relate to the fact that the Jewish "legal
system" consists of more than civil law. Equally important to the sys-
tem is the corpus of religious law, and a central characteristic of the
system as a whole is the religious element present in all areas of Jew-
ish law. 36 Indeed, without recognizing the religious basis of the entire
Jewish legal system, it is impossible to understand the fundamental
source and authority of the civil law.
As a result of religious principles, Jewish law imposes many du-
ties and obligations on the individual that are inconsistent with West-
ern definitions of "liberty" and autonomy.3 3 7 Similarly, questions of
"equality" within the Jewish legal system often involve religious issues
concerning the individual's place and role in the world, depending on
each individual's unique relationship to G-d. Many of these religious
considerations, which can define an individual's role in society, run
counter to basic assumptions underlying the American notion of
"equality." 338
The difficulties that would arise in applying to the Jewish legal
system the goals of "democracy" raised by Sullivan are symptomatic
335. See SOL ROTH, HALAKHAH AND PoLIncs: THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE STATE 97
(1988). For a general discussion of the different concepts of "liberty" found in Western and
Jewish thought, see id. at 93-103.
336. See supra text accompanying note 274.
337. As Rabbi Sol Roth has written, "Judaism's ... characterization of its conception of
freedom is a direct consequence of its supreme concern with duties or obligations." ROTH,
supra note 335, at 97; see also id at 93-103.
Robert Cover writes of the difference between the Jewish legal system and the Ameri-
can legal system in terms of an approach to civil rights. Cover writes that unlike the Amer-
ican system, the Jewish legal system places on individuals an obligation not only to
recognize the rights of others, but to realize those rights. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A
Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1989).
It should be noted that some scholars identify a similar affirmative duty on Congress
to protect constitutional human rights. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections
on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1107 (1986).
For a discussion of human rights in Jewish law, see ROTH, supra note 335, at 117-26.
338. See ROTH, supra note 335, at 52-55.
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of the problems that arise in attempts to classify Jewish law in terms of
modem political theory. One problem results from the unique struc-
ture of the American political/legal system. The arguments relating
rules and standards to issues of "democracy" focus on the role of the
judiciary as one of the three branches of government. Understanding
the precise place of judges within a Jewish political system requires a
complex analysis, but it is clear that these judges play a much different
role from that of their counterparts in the American system.
Apart from the unique nature of the American political structure,
a more fundamental problem complicates attempts to classify "the
Jewish legal system" within the categories of Western democratic
thought. The basic source for all Jewish thought, relating to religious,
legal or political matters, is a single religious guide, the Torah. In fact,
even a delineation of these different elements of the social structure is
difficult, as the Torah does not seem to distinguish between religious,
legal and political arenas. Instead, it prescribes a complex and com-
prehensive system of the interrelated and intertwined areas of reli-
gious, legal, and political life that together form Jewish society. A
classification of this system within Western democratic political theory
does not easily emerge. 39
Thus, the first two classes of argument described by Sullivan in
favor of rules or standards are readily applicable to the Jewish legal
system, while there does not appear to be a systematic way to apply to
Jewish law the other two types of arguments presented. The differ-
ences in applying the arguments may result from the fundamental dif-
ferences that exist in the nature of Sullivan's arguments.
The first two arguments, which relate to conceptual properties of
law, discuss the pros and cons of the rules or standards largely in
terms of the relationships of the judge and the individual to the law. 40
Such an analysis is just as relevant to the Jewish legal system as to the
American legal system because the two systems share a sufficiently
similar conceptual basis. Regardless of their specific roles within the
larger socio-political structures, judges and individuals in both legal
339. While the society described by Jewish law may be consistent with some of the
"fundamental principles of democracy, namely representative government and rule by ma-
jority... ," Ro-H, supra note 335, at 141, many aspects of Jewish law are inconsistent with
Western democratic ideals. Indeed, within the vast amount of scholarship in Jewish law,
there have not been many attempts to categorize the Jewish legal system within a particu-
lar political system. See id at 1 (finding that "while Jewish social philosophy [is] an area of
philosophic activity that has been largely neglected in the course of the history of Jewish
thought ... [p]olitical philosophy elicited even less interest").
340. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 62-63, 66.
systems will form their relationships to the law in part based on
whether laws are conceptually viewed as rules or as standards.
The other two arguments discussed by Sullivan involve the place
of the judge and the individual within society.341 To apply these argu-
ments to Jewish law, comparisons between the Jewish and American
legal systems must go beyond considerations of legal concepts to con-
siderations of larger socio-political issues. Comparisons in these areas
of the Jewish legal system are particularly difficult and will likely be
unsuccessful, in large part due to the religious nature of the Jewish
socio-political structure. Indeed, while the Jewish and American legal
systems may be well-suited for conceptual comparisons, it appears
that attempts at larger socio-political comparisons would fail to ac-
count for what certain scholars have noted to be the uniquely religious
nature of Jewish law.342
F. Problems with Rules and Standards in American Constitutional
Law
There are certain problems associated with attempts to categorize
constitutional interpreters as "rule-based" or "standard-based." On a
practical level, some may argue that the very practice of assigning to
judges such labels is flawed because each individual judge does not
always follow a single interpretive approach. Even those judges who
in most cases fit into one category of decision-makers, occasionally
issue decisions that place them in the other category. This inevitable
inconsistency on the part of almost all judges complicates and perhaps
even calls into question the validity of attempts to classify them.
On a more philosophical level, the classification of decision-mak-
ers into these two categories is disturbing because it seems to elimi-
nate a certain degree of both autonomy and analytical thinking in
legal interpretation. If an individual's legal views all stem from the
choice of which approach to utilize-rule-based or standard-based-
then the individual's autonomy is limited by one initial decision. Af-
ter the choice has been made to follow one approach, the applicable
legal directive will often be interpreted mechanically, with no need or
possibility for further decision based on the facts of a specific case.
Similarly, if an individual decides that all laws should be interpreted
through the same approach, rather than based on a consideration of
341. See id. at 62-67.
342. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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each law's specific characteristics, there is less need and opportunity
for careful and productive legal reasoning.343
Sullivan does not ignore the fact that "[n]o Justice is perfectly
consistent on the rules/standards choice."344 Indeed, Sullivan cites
many examples of such inconsistencies, some of which are found
within the same 1991 Court Term. For example, she writes that
although she has categorized Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
as favoring standards, the latter two Justices sometimes favor rules3 45
In one case,346 Sullivan notes, Kennedy "[went] flat out for [the]
bright-line rule[ ]" in "advocat[ing] an approach to resolving content
censorship claims that was even more categorical than the strict scru-
tiny rule: namely, per se invalidation." 7
Justice Souter has also shown an occasional acceptance of rules
over standards. Perhaps the most obvious example of this phenome-
non is Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,348 in which Souter wrote the dissenting opinion. Justice
O'Connor advocated a standard-based approach in her concurring
opinion, warning against categorical answers and simple tests in con-
struing the Establishment Clause.349 In direct contrast, Souter inter-
preted the Establishment Clause in absolute terms and asked, as if in
amazement, why the Court was unwilling to apply the clear law to the
clear facts.
350
Sullivan has uncovered inconsistencies in the approaches of many
other Justices. She observes that although Justice Stevens "most con-
sistently advocates standard-like approaches,' 351 in his opinion for the
majority in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp,352 he reaf-
343. Indeed, Schlag has suggested that "[t]he arguments we make for or against rules or
standards tend to be pretty much the same regardless of the specific issue involved .... The
... substantive context in which the arguments arise hardly seems to influence their basic
character. The arguments are drearily predictable, almost routine ... ." Schlag, supra note
188, at 380.
344. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 103 n.529.
345. See i at 92 n.482.
346. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-28 (1991).
347. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 92 n.482 (discussing Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Simon & Schuster).
348. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
349. See id. at 2526, 2528 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
350. See id. at 2539 (Souter, J., dissenting).
351. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 113 n.567.
352. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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firms a bright-line holding.353 In Quill Corp., Stevens acknowledged
that "bright-line tests ... appear[ ] artificial at [the] edges," but fa-
vored the test because of "the benefits of a clear rule. 3-4
Sullivan also identifies inconsistencies in the approaches of Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, Scalia and Thomas.35 5 In fact, in Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement,35 6 the Justices of rules and standards
reversed their roles in reviewing a county ordinance permitting a gov-
ernment administrator to vary the fee for assembling and parading.357
The majority, consisting of Justices who ordinarily favor standards,
(Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter), adopted a
bright-line test, holding that "[a] tax based on the content of speech
does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax." 358
Conversely, the typically rules-favoring Justices (Rehnquist, White,
Scalia and Thomas) would allow for an adjustable permit fee scheme
at the discretion of the county administrator.359
Despite these occasional inconsistencies, Sullivan does identify at
least general trends within the views of the different Justices. Having
demonstrated these trends, Sullivan searches further for the reasons
underlying the Justices' choices of which approach to adopt in the
rules/standards dichotomy. Sullivan engages in an extensive analysis
of two "perspectives" of why a particular Justice chooses one ap-
proach over the other. The first perspective, which she describes as
"tempting," offers a "political explanation."3 60 Sullivan acknowledges
that rules often correspond to extreme ideological poles, while stan-
dards are more conducive to intermediate positions. 361 Yet, she re-
jects the notion that rules or standards are inherently more similar to
either conservative or liberal political views. 362 Instead, Sullivan pre-
fers a second perspective, which she terms the "jurisprudential per-
spective. '36 3 According to this theory, "[all judges] aim at maintaining
judicial legitimacy," but they disagree as to which approach better
serves this goal.3 4 Sullivan develops, through an examination of rules
353. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 123.
354. i
355. See id at 113 n.567.
356. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
357. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 51.
358. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 136.
359. See id. at 141 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
360. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 96.
361. See id
362. See id.
363. Id
364. Id. at 112.
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and standards, two differing conceptions of the judicial role, as re-
flected in attitudes towards "history, knowledge and power. '365
Regardless of which perspective best describes why a decision-
maker favors rules or standards, the entire exercise of seeking to ex-
plain a judge's choice results in a somewhat unsettling conclusion. If
we accept the theory that individual judges choose one approach over
the other based on general perspectives of law, then we largely reject
the judge's role as an impartial arbiter whose decisions are based on
the specific facts of each case. A judge need only decide the broader
question of rules against standards; once this decision is made, the
decision in an individual case is often already determined. There may
be little need for or even possibility of a careful analysis of the facts
and legal issues involved in a particular case.366
G. A Potential Solution from Jewish Law
Perhaps a potential solution to the different problems that arise
from categorizing decision-makers into rules-based judges and stan-
dards-based judges can be found in the way the categories of rules and
standards apply to Jewish law. Rabbi Adler's statement at the conclu-
sion of his analysis of rules and standards in the context of laws of
quantification is instructive:
It should be noted that one is not restricted to accepting one or
the other of these two views relative to all cases. Rather, these
theories define two ways of viewing any prescribed quantity
measure, and in each particular case an independent decision
will have to be made as to the nature of the quantitative
measurement.
367
The rules/standards dichotomy appears to apply conceptually to Jew-
ish law in a manner that parallels the way it applies to American law.
Yet, as this quotation suggests, in Jewish law individual decision-mak-
ers do not necessarily view all laws through the same approach, based
on a set perspective of the role of the judge. Rather, because the
choice of rules or standards describes a method of interpreting laws,
Jewish decision-makers who apply the rules/standards dichotomy tend
365. Id. at 112-21.
366. Schlag has put this observation in stark and sarcastic terms, suggesting the possibil-
ity that "much of legal discourse (including the very fanciest law-talk) might be nothing
more than the unilluminating invocation of 'canned' pro and con arguments about rules
and standards." Schlag, supra note 188, at 380. A disturbing corollary to this discovery is
that, if individual judges are generally consistent in their choice of rules or standards, we
can frequently-if not usually-predict the outcome of a case, without looking to the spe-
cific facts of the case.
367. ADLER, supra note 190, at 30.
to focus on the nature of the individual law. Instead of assuming that
a decision-maker must choose in advance between rules and stan-
dards, scholars of Jewish law have recognized that individual laws may
possess certain properties that make them more likely to be under-
stood by particular decision-makers in terms of either rules or
standards. 368
Employing such an approach, these scholars have not been trou-
bled by the problems that American legal scholars have encountered
in analyzing the rules/standards dichotomy. When the focus is on the
law rather than on the individual decision-maker's perspective, there
is no reason to expect a decision-maker to choose consistently one
side of the rules/standards option. Instead, it is to be expected that
the same authority will interpret some laws as rules and other laws as
standards, depending on the authority's understanding of the nature
of each individual law.
Moreover, the decision-maker's choice of placing laws into cate-
gories is far from predetermined. To the contrary, the decision-maker
who has not made a general choice between rules and standards will
have to examine carefully each law to determine its nature. This deci-
sion may depend, in part, on the specific facts of the case in which the
law is to be applied. Thus, in each case, the decision-maker both re-
tains autonomy and is required to engage in extensive legal analysis,
considering both the unique nature of each legal directive and, at least
to some extent, the specific facts of the case.
Indeed, in discussing the views of individual Supreme Court Jus-
tices, Sullivan appears to allude to an approach based more on indi-
vidual laws and cases than on general and predetermined
considerations. Having recognized the reality that "[n]o Justice is en-
tirely consistent," Sullivan explains that "[m]uch depends on the na-
ture of the constitutional claim at issue."369 As support, she cites
many examples of inconsistencies in the approaches of a number of
Justices.370 These examples seem to indicate that, at times, Justices
pay closer attention to the specific laws and facts of cases than to con-
cerns related to rules or standards. Ultimately, however, Sullivan cat-
egorizes the Justices in terms of whether, for the most part, they favor
rules or standards.3
368. See id.
369. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 113 n.567.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 255-67.
371. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 122.
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There may be a number of reasons why the approach to rules and
standards in Jewish law cannot be applied to the American legal sys-
tem. Perhaps American decision-makers have in fact generally fa-
vored either rules or standards, without considering the individual
laws before deciding which method to apply. Indeed, Sullivan and
others have made convincing arguments that many debates through-
out American legal history can be understood through the lens of the
rules/standards dichotomy.
Rejecting the possibility of applying to American law an ap-
proach such as that in Jewish law based on past American constitu-
tional jurisprudence may not be entirely convincing. First, as a matter
of historical reality, many Justices have been far from consistent in
their choices of rules or standards. Indeed, as Sullivan pointed out, in
the 1991 Term alone there were many notable exceptions to the rules
and standards analysis. One of the advantages of the approach used
in Jewish law is that these inconsistencies do not pose a problem, as
there is no need to view the Justices in terms of general views and
troubling exceptions.
Moreover, even if the American rules/standards approach proves
to be a moderately accurate descriptive device for American jurispru-
dential debates, perhaps the problems presented by this approach
should motivate consideration of a different approach. The fact that
one theory is able to describe accurately a given set of facts does not
disqualify other theories that may have certain advantages over the
first theory.
At the very least, even if the current rules/standards approach
described by Sullivan and others is the most accurate way to describe
past jurisprudential attitudes, it would seem possible that the
problems in the current approach might lead us to look to a different
method for both judges and scholars to follow in the future. Such a
method could maintain the structure of rules and standards yet avoid
some of the troubling results from the current emphasis on the deci-
sion-makers' choosing to apply uniformly one of the options. The ap-
proach in Jewish law might provide a basis for such a method.
Perhaps there is a fundamental reason that the approach from
Jewish law is not likely to offer a plausible alternative for American
law. This reason may relate to Sullivan's explanation for the choice of
either rules or standards in the American legal system. It is notable
that, in her general discussion of reasons for rules or standards, Sulli-
van actually offers four possible arguments for rules, and four parallel
W 7GE
arguments for standards.372 Two of these arguments, the ones that are
somewhat universal to systems of laws and judges, are applicable in
the context of both the Jewish legal system and the American legal
system. The other two arguments, which are unique to Western
thought and American political structure, are unlikely to have particu-
lar relevance to Jewish law.373
Significantly, in discussing specifically why American judges
choose either rules or standards, Sullivan offers only two perspectives,
both of which relate uniquely to the American political system. One
perspective is explicitly political, to such an extent that Sullivan called
it "the political perspective." Decisions in Jewish law relating to rules
and standards are not based on politically liberal or conservative phi-
losophy. 74 The other perspective, which Sullivan finds more convinc-
ing, relates to judges' aims of maintaining judicial legitimacy.375 The
issues Sullivan describes, of the judge's role in relation to American
"history, knowledge, and power," also involve specifically the Ameri-
can political system, and are without parallel in the Jewish legal sys-
tem's treatment of rules and standards.
Therefore, accepting Sullivan's identification of the two perspec-
tives that will likely best explain the decisions of American judges, it is
understandable that she and other American legal scholars must con-
tinue to adhere to the current rules/standards approach. Any attempt
to apply a different approach, such as the one in Jewish law, to the
American legal system would require that judges no longer base their
decisions on considerations of the American political structure, as ar-
ticulated in Sullivan's perspectives.376
It can perhaps be suggested that if American judges were to place
less emphasis on their role in the American political system, they
might be able to apply the Jewish legal approach to rules and stan-
dards. The result could be judges and scholars who pay less attention
to political and ideological concerns and more attention to the nature
of the individual laws being interpreted and the specific facts of the
cases being decided.
372. See id. at 62-67.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 335-41.
374. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 96-112.
375. See id, at 112-21.
376. Indeed, Segall begins his article discussing Scalia and rules with a quotation from
Mark Tushnet that "law is politics, all the way down." Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Stud-
ies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1526 (1991), quoted in Segall, supra note 256,
at 992.
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Conclusion
It is not surprising that many issues that arise in an analysis of
Jewish law find their parallels in American legal theory, particularly in
constitutional theory. The two legal systems both stem from a funda-
mentally binding legal text, which must be interpreted if it is to serve
as the legal basis for a living society. The fact that Jewish law regu-
lates a religious as well as socio-political system, however, places cer-
tain limitations on comparisons between Jewish law and American
law. Nevertheless, although it is Divine in origin and principle and its
decisions represent the will of G-d, Jewish law is ultimately inter-
preted and decided by humans. Conversely, despite their secular ori-
gins, the Constitution and American law comprise the basic beliefs of
the United States, upon which all other institutions of the country are
founded.
Jewish law and American law are thus sufficiently similar to allow
for a meaningful yet cautious analysis of comparisons and contrasts
between the two legal systems, on many different conceptual levels.
The analysis may relate to broad issues of interpretation, such as ques-
tions of legal authority, as well as specific interpretive frameworks,
such as the rules/standards dichotomy. In many areas, principles in
Jewish law illuminate principles in American constitutional theory,
providing a counter-model from which American scholars can better
appreciate the American legal system.
The analysis of rules and standards in the two systems is impor-
tant because the rules/standards dichotomy is itself a useful way of
understanding each system on its own terms; as a result, the subse-
quent analysis of each system in light of the other is even more illumi-
nating. Yet, the rules/standards dichotomy is but one of numerous
conceptual frameworks for understanding the American legal system.
It remains to be seen if other such frameworks can be effectively ap-
plied to Jewish law as well.
In addition, perhaps a more challenging question relates to com-
paring and contrasting substantive areas of Jewish law and American
law. Again, it is not surprising that the two legal systems, both form-
ing the basis for a living society, share many broad parallels in terms
of substantive law, such as questions relating to torts and contracts. In
these areas, however, it appears that the religious nature of Jewish law
may place greater constraints on a helpful comparative analysis.
Hopefully, the recent increase in the use of Jewish law in American
legal discourse will continue into the future, in a principled and accu-
rate manner, allowing scholars to further investigate these questions.
